

CONFLICT VULNERABILITY IN PERU: AN ASSESSMENT

Presented by
Evidence Based Research (EBR)
Management Systems International (MSI)

Under contract to the
United States Agency for International Development
IQC #AEP-I-00-99-00040-00, Task Order #1

Submitted to
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

August 4, 2000

Bruce H. Kay, Ph.D.
Evidence Based Research, Inc. (EBR)

Prime Contractor:
Management Systems International, Inc.
600 Water Street, SW
Washington, DC 20024
(202) 484-7170

Views and conclusions expressed in this report are those of the authors and contributors and do not represent those of the project sponsor, or the United States Government.

Contents

Executive Summary	4
Project Summary.....	4
Personnel and Method	4
Summary of Findings	5
Table 1: Vulnerability by Conflict Scenario, 1995-2005	6
Table 2: Summary of Drivers & Inhibitors by Conflict Type	7
Framework and Definition of Terms.....	8
Analysis: Violent Conflict Drivers/Inhibitors	9
Governance Factors.....	9
State Capacity	10
Table 3: Fiscal Strength: Revenue, Reserves, Spending, Deficits	11
Table 4: Projects Approved by Foncodes and Expenditure by Department in 1998.....	12
State-Society Relations	14
Public Confidence in Institutions.....	17
Elections.....	18
Disaffected Youth.....	19
Table 5: Survey of Student Demonstrators	20
Table 6: Focus Group Survey Part 1: <i>Conflict Vulnerability</i>	21
Table 7: Focus Group Survey: Part 2: <i>Grievances</i>	22
General Government Disaffection	22
Table 8: Valid and Invalid Voting in National Elections, 1978-2000.....	23
Human Rights Abuses.....	23
Corruption	24
Centralization	25
Socioeconomic Factors.....	26
Economic Performance	26
Table: Latinobarómetro Survey 1999	27
Regression Analysis 1: Economic Factors and Internal War.....	28
Table 10: Economic Performance and Internal War: Bivariate Correlations	29
Table 11: Correlation Coefficients: Invalid (Null) Voting.....	29
Regression Analysis 2: Economic Factors and Civil Unrest	30
Table 12: Civil Unrest within 5 Years?	30
Table 13: Economic Performance and Civil Unrest	31
Regression Analysis 3: Economic Factors and Anomic Violence	31
Table 14: Economic Performance & Anomic Violence: Bivariate Correlations	31
Labor Stability.....	32
Ethnicity/Discrimination	32
Illicit Narcotics Industry	33
Table 15: Average Price of Coca Leaf by Geographic Area (US\$ per Kg.).....	34
Players and Their Interests: Parties to Conflict, Those Interested in Managing It.....	35
Regions Likely to Experience Violent Conflict	37
Table 16: Departments Affected by Violence, 1980-98 & 5-Year Conflict Vulnerability.....	39
Summary of Findings, General	40
Summary of Findings, Regional.....	41
Strategic Recommendations.....	42
Appendix A: Methodology & Future Application.....	46
Future Application.....	47
Appendix B Conflict Trends: Internal War.....	48
Internal War: Terrorist Attacks By Department, 1980-1998.....	49
Appendix C: Selected Regression Results (Significant Correlations Only)	50
Terrorist Attacks Lead Effects of 1-5 Years (Internal War).....	50
Civil Unrest within 5 Years? (0/1): Correlation Coefficients.....	51
Major Civil Unrest Occurs Within 5 Years: Logit Model of Civil Unrest	51
Anomic Violence (Criminal Violence Requiring Police Intervention).....	52

Appendix D. Selected Macroeconomic Variables	53
Appendix E: Chronology of Disputed 2000 Election in Peru and	54
OAS High Level Mission Proposal	54
Appendix F: Selected Regional Mobilization Chronologies:	59
Mobilizations in Huancayo	59
Mobilizations in Iquitos	62
Appendix G: Persons Interviewed	70
USAID/PERU	70
PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT	70
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS -- LIMA	70
MEDIA/JOURNALISTS	71
OTHER PERUVIANS	71
OTHER INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES	71
INTERVIEWS IN HUANCAYO	71
INTERVIEWS IN IQUITOS	72
Bibliography	73

Executive Summary

Project Summary¹

This report summarizes the findings of a Conflict Vulnerability Assessment, the purpose of which is to diagnose causes of violent conflict in Peru and to assess Peru's susceptibility to an outbreak or escalation of conflict over a five-year period. Conflict was understood to comprise four basic types: internal war, civil unrest, anomic violence, and a military coup. All of these types are defined, operationalized and investigated in this report. EBR collected data, held interviews and focus groups with an array of experts, journalists, officials, and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and surveyed documentation as well as scholarly literature in order to perform the analysis.

In seeking to understand conflict potential in Peru, USAID is working toward developing valid models to assess conflict vulnerability in other countries. The purpose is to allow USAID to identify potential flash points and direct its resources to help prevent future conflicts in order to achieve its development assistance goals while safeguarding its development investments. Agency conflict prevention policy includes a commitment to country strategies that address root causes of conflict and political and economic crises where they threaten USAID strategic objectives or broader U.S. national interests. The goal is to improve development assistance to prevent such crises to the extent possible.

Because there is no standard scope or method for this type of analysis, the parameters were developed by USAID-Washington with valuable inputs from the USAID Mission in Peru. Using this prototype, EBR, in consultation with the Peru Mission, forged a research design that included both field research and data analysis. Data were harvested from information collected by the USAID Peru Democracy and Governance (D/G) Assessment Team (February-March 2000) on which the author was also a member. Part of the research was done during a subsequent four-day field visit in April 2000, during which the author interviewed experts and collected data and documents in Lima. The final part of the research included 6 days of field research in June 2000, during which the author visited Huancayo in the highland department of Junín, and Iquitos, in the Amazon department of Loreto and conducted interviews and focus groups at local universities.

Personnel and Method

MSI selected Dr. Bruce Kay, Political Scientist and country expert, with a special interest in governance and violence issues and eight years of experience doing research in Peru. Dr. Kay spent 4 days on site in Peru between April 10 and April 14, 2000. During this period, Dr. Kay had briefings with USAID-Peru staff, reviewed Mission documents and materials produced by current grantees, and conducted interviews with independent analysts, political and economic leaders, and civil society representatives.

¹ The author wishes to acknowledge USAID-Washington and the USAID Mission in Peru for its generous assistance and logistic support for the field research component of this study. Thanks to Management Systems International (MSI) for its assistance in contractual issues.

In addition to surveying experts, Dr. Kay also administered a survey to student demonstrators during the opposition rally in Lima on May 28, 2000, the day of the runoff presidential election. Finally, Dr. Kay collected data on macroeconomic performance, conflict and voting at national and sub-national levels, and then analyzed these data, the findings of which are summarized in different sections of this report. Dr. Kay later returned to interview experts and students in Huancayo (Junín Department) and Iquitos (Loreto), the results of which are cited throughout the report and summarized in Appendix F. The methodology is detailed in Appendix A.

Summary of Findings

Summarized below and in Table 1 are this study's findings with respect to Peru's conflict vulnerability over the next five years, based on a survey administered to experts, corroborated by an empirical analysis:

1. ***Vulnerability to a resurgence of armed conflict war led by Sendero Luminoso (SL) and/or the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) is low.*** Pacification success, albeit with some human rights abuses in the process, and improved state capacity to maintain public order has had an enduring impact, primarily positive and in some ways negative, on state-society relations in former terrorist bastions. Not only has it decimated SL; it has also reduced vulnerability to terrorist resurgence. Differences remain in security status across regions.
2. ***Vulnerability to an outbreak of armed conflict led by new actors is low.*** The probability is slightly higher than it was over the last ten years, given dissatisfaction with the government, unemployment, and discontent among mobilized youth in areas such as Lima, Arequipa, Iquitos, Cusco, Chimbote, Huancayo and Trujillo. In Iquitos in particular, the risk that certain actors mobilized around issues of nationalism, sovereignty and antagonism toward the government is slightly higher now than in years past, but still considered low.
3. ***Vulnerability to sustained, violent civil unrest is high.*** Dissatisfaction with the government, along with economic slow-down and unemployment, has rendered Peru more vulnerable to what is referred to as a *desborde popular*, mobilization and sustained unrest with episodic violence directed against the state. Susceptibility is augmented by President Fujimori's re-election in a dubious electoral process that has spurred anti-government rallies throughout Peru. These mobilizations have thus far been peaceful, but provocation – from either the government or the protesters -- could push protest outside the bounds of legality.
4. ***Vulnerability to a military coup is low.*** The Peruvian Armed Forces have lost institutional autonomy over the past decade as military leadership was subordinated to Executive control. The loss of autonomy will likely contribute to unrest among mid-rank officers that many manifest in more open intra-institutional divisions, but the likelihood of a coup is low to marginal. Reasons often cited include the military's lack of capacity for governance, its lack of will to govern, and the probability of international isolation resulting from a *coup d'état*.
5. ***Vulnerability to anomic violence is high.*** If economic conditions do not improve over the next five years, Peru's vulnerability to violence without any specific political purpose or agenda (such as delinquency) is medium to high. This type of violence by its very nature is likely to be confined to urban areas.

Table 1: Vulnerability by Conflict Scenario, 1995-2005*

Conflict Type	Score 1995-2000	Vulnerability 1995-2000	Score** 2000-2005	Vulnerability 2000-2005
Resumption of Armed Conflict <i>Sendero Luminoso (SL)</i> <i>MRTA</i>	28	Low	28	Low
Outbreak of Armed Conflict <i>New Actors</i>	25	Low	30	Low
Civil Unrest (Demonstrations, Riots)	30	Low	70	High
Military Coup	25	Low	20	Low
Anomic Violence	48	Medium	75	High

*Source: Data based on interviews with 25 experts, Lima, Peru.

** Scored as follows: Marginal=0; Low=1; Medium=2; High=3 per individual

Aggregated score <20=marginal; 20-30=low; 31-50=medium; >51=high. N=12 Respondents

Our analysis also found robust linkages between factors designated as *conflict drivers* (variables showing a positive relationship to the outbreak or intensity of conflict) and those designated *conflict inhibitors* (variables showing a negative relationship to the outbreak and or intensity of violent conflict). Diagnosing drivers and inhibitors was accomplished using a variety of statistical diagnostic techniques, including regression analyses.

The results of this empirical analysis are summarized in Table 2, and detailed throughout the body of the report. Note that the drivers and inhibitors listed in the Table are subdivided into governance or political-institutional factors (“GOV”) and socioeconomic or social, economic and demographic factors (“SEC”). Note that the drivers and inhibitors listed for military coup are based on expert opinion rather than data analysis, for reasons which are explained in the Methodology Appendix (A).

Table 2: Summary of Drivers & Inhibitors by Conflict Type

Type	Drivers (+)		Inhibitors (-)	
Armed Conflict	GOV	Human Rights Abuses (#, Severity) Weak rule of law Corruption Centralization Reduction in military support for civil defense committees Strength of illicit (drug) economy (price of coca, production)	GOV	Revenue % GDP Expenditure % GDP Social Expenditure (FONCODES, etc.) % total expenditures Surplus/Deficit & GDP Intl. Reserves, US\$ Millions Public Sector Wages Civil Defense participation
	SEC	Inflation Manufacturing % GDP State Owned Enterprises % GDP Strikes and Lockouts, frequency, annual	SEC	Food exports % merchandise exports Foreign direct investment % GDP Trade % GD Current revenue % GDPO Private consumption % GDP
Civil Unrest	GOV	Elections ² Regime Disaffection (% Invalid vote) Low Public Confidence in Political Institutions (incl. police) Human Rights Abuses (#, Severity) Weak Rule of Law Corruption Centralization	GOV	Institutional reform implementation Institutional confidence-restoring measures Government expenditures on social policy, infrastructure
	SEC	Economic decline % GDP Unemployment, Underemployment Foreign Direct Investment	SEC	Economic growth % GDP Strikes and Lockouts Surge in employment (% EAP)
Anomic Violence	GOV	Elections Disaffected Youth General Government Disaffection Low Public Confidence in Political Institutions (incl. police)	GOV	Police presence Trust in institutions (incl. police)
	SEC	Economic decline % GDP Inflation rate surge Unemployment (%EAP)	SEC	Inflation rate decline, stability Surge in employment Inflation Reduction Employment Growth Strikes and Lockouts
Military Coup	GOV	Elections Executive-legislative impasse Sharp reduction in military outlays, military salaries	GOV	Continued civilian control Higher military budgets Military salary (same or greater)
	SEC	Economic crisis conditions (hyperinflation, recession)	SEC	Foreign Direct Investment (% GDI) Trade % GDP International Aid, Credit % GDP

GOV= governance factors

SEC=Socioeconomic factors

² For disputed or dubious elections.

Framework and Definition of Terms

As the objective is to assess conflict vulnerability, it is appropriate to begin by defining terms. Operationally, we distinguish between two conflict types whose characteristics vary according to the degree of organization, goals, and reported casualties. Conflict types include (1) *internal war* and (2) *civil unrest*. These types share characteristics in common and may be linked in time and space, but have distinct origins or patterns of causality. We define these forms as follows:

- *Internal War*: Organized violence in which an armed opposition attempts to challenge and/or topple a regime. For a conflict to be considered internal war, three conditions must be present: (a) Opposition must seek to seize state power or to gain autonomy for some portion of state territory, (b) Violence must target agents of the state or government, and (c) Opposition must have mobilized popular support. Examples include guerrilla war, separatist rebellions.
- *Civil Unrest*: Violent strife, such as labor strikes, riots and violent demonstrations, directed against a government in order to effect a change in policy or government. While this conflict type may be organized, it does not rise to the level of organization required for an armed campaign. In order to be considered civil unrest, the conflict must (a) Occur in more than one locality or be sustained over at least two consecutive days, or both, (b) Involve at least several hundred participants, and (c) Involve violence as a primary tactic. Violence may be aimed at various targets, including police, private property, and government buildings.

Common to these forms is that (a) *the government or regime is the primary target of violence*, and that both (b) *pose a threat to public order*. This report addresses vulnerability to two additional conflict categories, both of which may result in larger scale violence and which also have implications for regime stability and public order. These categories include *anomic violence*, defined as criminal violence without an explicit political purpose; and *a military (or military-supported) coup d'état*.

- *Anomic Violence*³ Unorganized, episodic criminal violence without an explicit political purpose, such as looting, armed robbery, assault, murder, drug trafficking and racketeering by individuals and groups. The sources of criminal activity vary, but such actions are not necessarily devoid of political significance.
- *Coup d'Etat*: A successful attempt by insurgent elites to remove ruling regimes from power by extraconstitutional means, and are accompanied by actual or threatened resorts to physical violence. *Coups* are relatively covert actions that ignore or bypass the regular channels or "rules of the game" concerning the succession process. A coup is an event in which a regime is suddenly and illegally displaced by an insurgent elite group without overt mass participation in the event itself. It may not involve a military seizure of power.

Using these operational definitions avoids lumping all aspects of politics, society, and economics into a single, hard-to-measure concept of conflict, and focuses on identifying relationships with

³ The term "Anomic violence" is taken from the sociological literature. It is derived from the concept of *anomie*, a structural condition in which social norms are weak or in conflict.

specific conflict forms, each conceived as a product of multiple factors. The analysis now proceeds to identifying conflict “drivers” (causal factors) and “inhibitors” (mitigating factors). Each driver or inhibitor will be discussed in detail, with a summary of its dynamic and meaning in Peru, and the impact of each factor upon conflict vulnerability.

Analysis: Violent Conflict Drivers/Inhibitors

This section identifies conflict *drivers* and *inhibitors*, drawing from a list generated by USAID and vetted by experts. They are broken down into two categories that reflect our main finding: that the root drivers combine governance (political-institutional) factors and socioeconomic factors. For each driver or inhibitor, the analysis considers the core issue that relates to conflict propensity over the ensuing five years.

Each factor is listed with a sign (+, -) indicating the direction of the effect on the conflict type. A positive sign (+) indicates, other things equal, that the factor tends to increase (drive) conflict vulnerability. The negative sign (-) indicates that the factor tends to reduce (inhibit) vulnerability. The sign is listed for each conflict type where an effect was detected by the analysis.

Governance Factors

Governance has improved over the the last decade as Peru enacted key state reforms -- from privatization and tax reform, to the establishment of entities required for a market economy, to infrastructure development and social support for regions hit hard by economic crisis and violence – all of which have strengthened key state institutions that were extraordinarily weak or underdeveloped during the conflict-ridden 1980s. Public order also improved, as military, police and civil society all contributed to the pacification of the insurgency led by Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the MRTA.

Governance factors thus do not favor an eruption or resumption of armed conflict. State capacity has strengthened since 1990, especially in areas that had little or no state presence during the conflict-ridden 1980s, reducing armed mobilization opportunities. The public also repudiates the violent option favored by SL and the MRTA.

Governance conditions do, however, favor civil unrest. Dissatisfaction with government is higher now than five years ago and may intensify, and public trust in key political institutions has also weakened, spurring mobilizations following the elections. Much depends on the government response; whether the government satisfies demands for institutional reforms and economic improvement or resorts to repression will determine whether vulnerability to civil unrest is enhanced or reduced over the next five years.

Gains in governance that have reduced conflict vulnerability include (a) greater state capacity and (b) changes in state-society relations in key areas that were once conflict zones. Both changes reduce vulnerability to outbreak or resurgence of terrorism, though in some cases they have galvanized regional opposition to the central government, increasing susceptibility to unrest.

State Capacity (-)

A key factor influencing conflict vulnerability is *state capacity*, defined, following Grindle (1995), along four dimensions:


- (1) *Legal capacity*: the ability to maintain public order by setting and enforcing rules governing economic and political interaction
- (2) *Political capacity*: the ability to maintain channels for demand-making, representation, and conflict resolution;
- (3) *Technical capacity*: the ability to manage economic policy, including distribution of goods and services and promotion of growth; and
- (4) *Administrative capacity*: the ability to maintain infrastructure and promote development and social welfare.

States vary along these dimensions in their capacity to control conflict vulnerability and in their capacity to demobilize conflict once it occurs. States also vary in capacity in relation to other states, to the societies over which they have dominion, and in historical terms. State capacity can

also vary across regions of the same country. Certain areas of national territory may have a more palpable state presence than others – more government offices, law enforcement, visible police and government officials.

Figure 1: Revenue as % of GDP in Peru, 1980-2000

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática



Fiscal Strength (-) One way to operationalize state capacity is as revenues and reserves available for conversion into spending. Fiscal strength impinges on most government functions. Reduced resources means lower salaries for civil servants (including police and military) which carries implications for public sector competence, integrity, morale and

efficiency. Fiscal solvency enables the state to maintain spending to provide goods and services to the population. States on solid fiscal footing, other things equal tend to be stronger, while states in dire straits are not only weaker across dimensions of state capacity, but might be forced into austerity, increasing conflict susceptibility.

In 1990, Peru had one of the largest states in Latin America, the product of a state-building project implemented under military rule (1968-1980). Despite its size and its ownership over the economy, however, Peru's state was among the region's weakest. It was incapable of enforcing the rule of law, inept at economic management, ineffective at providing services, and unable to sustain control over parts of national territory. Following ten years of restructuring, Peru's state is leaner, and its role in the economy changed by an aggressive privatization program. The public sector employs less than half the civil servants employed in 1990. Despite the reduction in size, however, Peru's state is better at maintaining order, more efficient in daily operations, more effective at extracting revenues and targeting spending at specific developmental needs.

Peru's fiscal picture has improved (Figure 1), due to economic stability and reform of the tax collection agency in the 1990s. Revenues recovered since their 1990-91 lows; they now hover at around 12 percent, though a slowdown in income has eroded the revenue gain. Reserves and deficits, meanwhile, suggest healthy government finances, and sufficient resources with which to implement policies and pay public sector workers, strengthening legal, technical and administrative capacities. (Table 3) The fiscal situation may deteriorate over the next five years unless the economy improves. Shrinking revenues and increased deficits, resulting from a relaxed fiscal policy hint at deterioration and, possibly, renewed fiscal restraint.

Table 3: Fiscal Strength: Revenue, Reserves, Spending, Deficits

Source: Cuánto 1999.

Year	Tax Revenue % GDP	Net International Reserves \$US Millions	Spending % GDP	Government Surplus/Deficit
1980	15.8		15	-2.4
1985	12.7	1363	14	-2.1
1990	9.2	682	15	-6.8
1991	8.9	1933	10	-2
1992	10	2425	12.3	-3.4
1993	9.8	2910	11.5	-3
1994	11	6025	12.3	-2.8
1995	11.5	6693	13.2	-3
1996	12	8862	12.7	-1.3
1997	12	7982	11.8	-0.8
1998	12	7134	12	-1
1999	11.4	7674	12.7	-2.7
2000	11.8	7975	12.9	-2.8

Technical capacity (- internal war, civil unrest, anomic violence). A state's capability to execute policies can be operationalized, among other ways, by using indicators like public sector wages, which have implications for competence and morale of public sector workers, including agents that serve an order or law enforcement role. In Peru, public sector wages are low relative to the rest of the region, but higher than the early 1990s and unlikely to erode much in the next five years if inflation is held in check. (Figure 2) Additional variables that measure this capacity include budget outlays for executive agencies, the military and the police.

Administrative capacity (- internal war; - civil unrest; -anomic violence) or the ability to administer infrastructure and perform administrative functions necessary to economic development and social welfare, may be operationalized using per capita government expenditures, as well as spending on health, education and infrastructure. Other things equal, such spending mitigates vulnerability to internal war and civil unrest. Social spending in Peru, part of a developmental and pacification strategy, has been accomplished through executive agencies such as Foncodes (National Development and Social Compensation Fund) and Pronaa (National Nutritional Assistance Program), designed to maximize beneficiaries in areas of greatest need.⁴ Other agencies include Infes (National Institute of Education and Health Infrastructure),

⁴ A World Bank study of Foncodes concluded that (a) expenditures increased significantly before national elections; (b) projects were directed at provinces in which the marginal political effect of expenditures was likely to be largest, and (c) these projects favored the poorest provinces, which suggests that the program also has a redistributive

Banco de Materiales, and Cofopri (Formalizing Commission of Informal Property). Funds for these agencies are channeled through the Ministry of the Presidency (MIPRE), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, often making a direct, public connection to the President's office.

These agencies achieved impressive results. They sponsored the construction of hundreds of schools, clinics, and roads and created jobs in hard-hit areas. They also served to maintain government support in the highlands, the central jungle, and poor urban-marginal areas of Lima—all of which were enclaves of support for leftist parties and zones of terrorist activity during the 1980s. Huge spending increases in these areas, during electoral campaigns, is related to the vote for Fujimori in 1995 and, to a lesser extent in 2000. Departments that benefited most from spending sponsored by FONCODES in 1998 were areas that were pro-government in the 1995 elections and with some exceptions remained pro-government in 2000. (Table 4)

Table 4: Projects Approved by Foncodes (1998), Expenditure & Fujimori Vote by Department

<i>Degree Affected</i>	<i>Depart.</i>	<i># Projects</i>	<i>Expenditure (Soles)</i>	<i>Pop. (Thousands)</i>	<i>Spending per Capita</i>	<i>% Fujimori 1995</i>	<i>% Fujimori 2000 1st Round</i>	<i>Majority Fuji 1st Round</i>
High	Ayacucho	376	29,574	526	56.224	74	53	Yes
	Apurimac	300	21,462	419	51.222	69	59	Yes
	Huancavelica	288	21,037	423	49.733	64	46	No
	Amazonas	244	17,464	391	44.665	65	57	Yes
	Huanuco	339	29,964	747	40.112	73	53	Yes
	Cajamarca	805	52,349	1377	38.017	70	62	Yes
	Loreto	447	26,516	840	31.567	54	34	No
	Puno	452	35,516	1172	30.304	67	40	No
Med.	Cusco	461	30,895	1131	27.317	61	41	No
	Ancash	358	28,039	1046	26.806	61	43	No
	Moquegua	62	3,597	142	25.331	74	41	No
	Madre de Dios	52	3,193	79	23.076	62	45	No
	San Martin	135	14,463	692	20.900	63	62	Yes
	Ucayali	141	8,011	395	20.281	77	55	Yes
	Piura	391	24,287	1507	16.116	65	55	Yes
	La Libertad	354	21,942	1416	15.496	57	47	No
	Pasco	53	3,601	246	14.638	66	54	Yes
	Arequipa	155	12,899	1036	12.451	61	46	No
	Junin	234	14,421	1162	12.410	77	58	Yes
Low	Ica	77	4,736	629	7.529	62	48	No
	Lambayeque	123	7,453	1029	7.243	62	48	No
	Tacna	27	1,639	261	6.280	67	42	No
	Tumbes	15	836	261	3.203	67	63	Yes
	Lima Metrop.	151	16,652	7195	2.314	64	51	Yes

Source: ONPE, FONCODES

Spending seems not to have had much political effect in terms of generating government support in anti-government Loreto. Only minimally affected by terrorism during the 1980s, Loretans don't appear to credit the government with pacification success, as many do in the more violence-affected highland departments that were also beneficiaries of FONCODES and other support

function. Norbert R. Schady. 2000. "The Political Economy of Expenditures by the Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES), 1991–95." *American Political Science Review* 94 (June): 289–304.


programs. The government's peace pact with Ecuador sparked regional resentment that has proved resistant to spending. In Junín, beneficiaries of public works spending have been concentrated in rural areas rather than in Huancayo, the only Andean city affected by terrorism during the 1980s and '90s in which government support remains weak. Opposition tendencies in both areas have yet to produce organized movements; resistance is more in the nature of civil unrest.

Legal Capacity (- internal war, - civil unrest, - anomic violence, -coup)

Defined as the ability to set and enforce rules, legal capacity includes the capacity to maintain order, elicit compliance with laws, and sanction and punish actors who disobey them. Operationalized, legal capacity includes the strength of military and police forces, measured in appropriations and salaries paid to active duty personnel and institutional strength and effectiveness. A second indicator of legal capacity is the effectiveness of judicial institutions in dispensing justice and generally applying the rule of law in an impartial way across society.

Figure 3: Terrorist Incidents in Peru 1980-1999

Source: Peruvian National Police



In terms of maintaining order, eliciting compliance with rules and punishing actors who disobey them, the State's legal capacity has strengthened over the last ten years. An obvious indication is the decline of terrorist incidents since the peak violent years (1989-1992), indicated by Figure 3. Violence declined in large part due to the arrest of key terrorist leaders and the government's ongoing counterinsurgency efforts against both Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).

In eliciting compliance with laws and punishing the actors who disobey them,

however, the state's record is mixed. Data suggest the Judicial branch is seen as lacking independence, and rife with incompetence, corruption and inefficiency. (Figure 6) Initial reform efforts made some progress in accelerating certain (especially drug trafficking and terrorism) cases, modernizing proceedings and using conciliation mechanisms. But the lack of judicial independence and perceived Executive interference of this sector remains. Donors have thus preferred to channel resources to selected government entities and NGOs that provide ombudsman, legal defense, advocacy, arbitration and conciliation services rather than providing support directly to the judicial branch.

As for the capacity of Peru's legal and penal system to process and sentence those charged with crimes, the record is lackluster and worsening. According the *Instituto Nacional Penitenciario (INPE)* in September 1999, 62 percent of the incarcerated population in Peru was in various stages of processing, while only 38 percent had been sentenced. At the same time, the penal population over the last ten years increased from 18,000 (1990) to around 28,000 (2000). The rise

in incarceration combined with the slowness of processes leading to sentencing produced an alarming increase in prison overcrowding, especially in Lima.⁵

It is hard to make a direct connection between rule of law issues and conflict susceptibility, but the perception that many judges are incompetent or corrupt decreases public confidence in the judicial branch, which erodes government legitimacy. To the extent that institutional mistrust underlies antigovernment protest, the government can reduce conflict vulnerability by delivering meaningful reform, demonstrating its commitment to democratic institutions. If the government raises expectations of reforms and then fails implement them, however, the gap between policy and implementation could intensify discontent and increase conflict susceptibility.

Political capacity, or the ability to channel and respond to demands from civil society, is tricky to operationalize and measure, given the limitations of data available for this investigation. This is a two-dimensional factor, since it includes both the availability of mechanisms through which claims can be made upon the state and the availability of resources to the regime to control or demobilize potential sources of violent conflict.

It was difficult to conclude whether political capacity has strengthened or weakened over the last ten years, and what projections could be made for the next five years. Interviewees by no means sympathetic with the government suggested that the state has made strides in terms of the delivery of public goods, social support and infrastructure development in response to citizen demands, though many believed that a primary objective in delivering goods and services was to maintain government support. Few argued that the state is inclusionary in terms of its governance style, however. On the contrary, the state seems limited in its capacity to channel citizen demands, resulting in higher political disaffection (“Disaffection” section, below)


State-Society Relations

Civil-Military Relations (- *internal war*, + *civil unrest*) Order in any society is tenuous without capacity to enforce the rules, the minimal condition for which that the State preserve the monopoly of force throughout national territory. Even that minimal capacity was challenged in Peru during the 1980s by Shining Path. Changes in state-society relations over the last decade have contributed to the country’s pacification, converting urban and rural areas that were once terrorist strongholds into bastions of regime support. A key change in state-society relations that undermined internal war vulnerability is the establishment of civil defense patrols, referred to as *rondas campesinas*.

Rural civil defense began in the late 1980s as military commanders coordinated with peasant patrols to watch over their communities and fend off SL incursions in the highlands. As communities cooperated with military authorities and the rural resistance coalesced, the *ronda* approach was codified in a set of decrees passed in 1991 that effectively handed over most functions reserved for civilian authorities to regional military commanders, who were also authorized to arm civil defense patrols.

⁵ Roberto Meza, “Motines en penales: La política del encierro y el olvido.” IDL. No. 126 (March 2000), pp. 77-80.


Figure 4 Terrorist Actions in 5 Andean Departments, 1980-



military commanders as the army launched attacks against SL cadres. The result was a weakening of SL and a corresponding decline in terrorist activity in Huánuco and San Martín. (Figure 5)

State strengthening in violence-afflicted zones affected state- society relations, reducing mobilizational opportunities for anti-regime actors while strengthening ties with the central government. What remains of SL continues to function at low intensity in the Huallaga, Apurimac and Ene-Tambo valleys but no longer poses a threat to regime stability. Infrequent armed confrontations have occurred in the newer coca regions, including the jungle provinces of

Figure 5: Terrorist Actions in 5 Jungle Departments



Civil defense achieved dramatic results; violence dropped in the Andes early in the 1990s, predating the 1992 capture of SL leader Abimael Guzmán, the event credited with having crippled the SL organization. (Figure 4) In the mid 1990s, the military organized, armed and coordinated activities with the *rondas* in the jungle, including the coca-producing Upper Huallaga Valley, as they had in the highlands. Rondas succeeded in curbing terrorist influence in this area of activity in the 1980s and early 1990s. No longer viewing SL as vital to their economic interests or security, coca producers cooperated with regional

Ayacucho, and areas of Huánuco and Ucayali. Most SL-perpetrated deaths have been civilian deaths, though most recent actions are acts of sabotage rather than killings. In Lima and in regions to the south, SL terrorists shifted to a strategy aimed at gaining support through actions short of direct confrontation.⁶ Violent attacks in Lima have consequently diminished steadily from their 1992 peak.

What conditions would make terrorist resurgence likely over the next five years? Most experts agreed this was improbable, though SL's goal is to salvage its organization, preserve its leadership, and create bases of support until conditions permit a renewal of armed conflict. A

⁶ Such geographical divisions may reflect the group's internal division between the militant "Red" faction, which maintains its strongest presence in the jungle, and the "Gonzalist" (peace accord) faction, which maintains a sporadic presence in Lima and parts of the *sierra*. "Gonzalists" (named for "Gonzalo," Abimael Guzmán's *nom de guerre*) appear to be returning to their roots, appealing to civilians as SL did in its developmental days, with little success.

reason often cited for the low likelihood of armed conflict was the alleged extent to which Peruvians were said to reject violence as a means by which to effect changes in government, a reflection of the social trauma caused by two decades of conflict. Others note that a key organizing principle of armed conflict – ideology – is absent from opposition discourse, reflecting a discrediting of the Marxist principles that inspired revolutionaries from the 1960s to the 1980s.


A reactive strain of nationalism could substitute for ideology in the mobilization of new insurgent groups. One expert painted grim scenarios in which nationalist passions in Loreto, inflamed by sovereignty issues related to the peace accord with Ecuador, led to an outbreak of a regional terrorist group not unlike the EZLN (*Zapatistas*) in Mexico. In this view, the *Frente Patriótico de Loreto (FPL)* could emerge as a lightning rod for radicalized regional opposition, provoking confrontations with local military forces.

Other experts emphasized that privatization -- specifically outrage over the perceived “sale of national patrimony” to foreign investors in a dysfunctional economy – could emerge as a flash point for nationalism. A few cited traditional regional antagonisms toward Lima, fueled by government unwillingness to restart the decentralization process or grant regional and local governments sufficient autonomy and resources.

We found *little empirical support for these assertions*, reinforcing experts’ conclusions that the likelihood of internal war before 2005 was low. In the unlikely event that such a phenomenon does occur, however, it could take the form of a radicalization of existing groups who employ violence as one of several tactics, including peaceful protest, to agitate for reforms central government authorities are unwilling or unable to undertake.


Factors that contribute to internal war, however unlikely, include the erosion of state capacity, or a fracturing of state-society relations forged to isolate and weaken SL. The government relied on a pacification model that required not only military participation, but also the involvement of key sectors of civil society. State-society relations, based to a large extent on economic ties with the central government, could unravel as the fiscal condition of the central government deteriorates. Reducing support for *rondas* might also erode order in the countryside, rendering highland and jungle regions vulnerable to conflict. This analysis found no evidence to warrant a strong conclusion in this regard. On the contrary, societal transformations in places like Ayacucho seem profound and enduring.

Figure 6: Public Approval of Political Institutions, Opposition and President Fujimori, 1990-2000, APOYO



declining throughout the 1990s, despite the government's judicial reorganization following the *autogolpe*, and has never had an approval rating higher than 30 percent. (Figure 6) Mistrust in the judicial branch of government is a regional problem. According to the *Latinobarómetro* surveys, however, Peru ranks at the bottom of its sample of Latin American countries in the degree of public confidence expressed in the judiciary. At 18 percent confidence, Peru's ranking was half of the regional average (36%) in 1997.⁷

Figure 7: Public Attitudes Toward Police, 1990-1998



⁷ *Latinobarómetro*, 1997.

Public Confidence in Institutions

(- Civil Unrest, - Anomic Violence)

Institutional mistrust increases susceptibility to violent conflict. Institutional trust in Peru is below average for the region according to *Latinobarómetro* surveys, and lower relative to the United States or European polities. Appraisal of institutions in Peru has never been resoundingly positive. Over the past ten years, however, there has been a pattern of surge and decline in government approval and support for the Congress and a steady deterioration in the public's faith in the *rule of law* as embodied by the judicial system and the police. Approval for the judiciary, never high to begin with, has been

Trust in the police, meanwhile, is low. Poll data show that only about a third of respondents in 1998 trusted the police. Half claimed that police inspired "fear" rather than a sense of "security." Focus group surveys confirm deterioration in relations between civilians and police following confrontations during the election mobilizations. In Iquitos, police launched tear gas bombs from helicopters to disperse crowds and used force against the demonstrators, fueling public outrage. Even in places where the police behaved with restraint, civil-police relations are less than harmonious. The degeneration of relations with the police is a driver of unrest, and may culminate in cycles of

provocation and crackdown. (Figure 7) Institutional confidence-building measures, conversely, could be considered conflict inhibitors; policy aimed at rectifying what the public considers institutional shortcomings can reduce conflict vulnerability.

Elections (+ civil unrest, + anomic violence, + coup)

Even valid elections can be destabilizing to unconsolidated democracies, fueling tensions that lead to violence. This has been true in Africa, where elections have exacerbated tensions that provoked violence among communal groups. Research finds elections to be a driver rather than an inhibitor of conflict *where institutions are weak and faith in the neutrality of electoral agencies is absent*.

Twenty years since its democratic transition, elections remain problematic in Peru. Anxieties about the potential for fraud and generally weak public trust in the entities responsible for guaranteeing the electoral process led to a call for domestic and international observers to monitor the 1995 elections. Those elections were deemed free and fair, but irregularities in the preferential vote cast doubts on the government's parliamentary majority and did little to assuage concerns, especially among opposition groups, that Peru's electoral agencies were inadequate to guarantee free and fair elections.

By the time President Fujimori declared his candidacy for a constitutionally dubious third term (2000-2005), confidence in electoral institutions was very low,⁸ precipitating another call for international observers to monitor the 2000 electoral process, which has been one of the most questioned and problematic in Peru's history. The 2000 elections will have immediate and lasting consequences. Longer-term consequences are hard to predict, but a few observations may be made about their immediate consequences for conflict vulnerability.

First, President Fujimori will remain in power for the next five years. Opponents have vowed to mobilize domestic and international opinion to force a new election in which Fujimori would be barred from candidacy. This is unlikely given the extent to which the international community is adapting to the post-election status quo. Nevertheless, the solid popular backing and mandate for *continuismo* after the President's stunning victory in 1995 has evaporated. A hefty chunk of the electorate supports the President (close to a majority), but the support is softer and less enthusiastic than in 1995. A vocal antigovernment contingent has made its presence felt in Peru's cities. Whether it will materialize into an organized opposition party is unclear, but whatever its fate, this mobilized sector has cast doubt on the legitimacy of the government's third term. From a D&G standpoint, popular mobilizations, while increasing the risk of violence, may be a positive development in so far as they spur delayed reforms.

Second, the government inaugurated on July 28, 2000 will be weaker than that inaugurated in 1995. A main reason is the change in the composition of Congress. Although the Congress is as much a reflection of the flawed electoral process as the outcome in the presidential contest, neither opposition nor government actors have challenged the fact that the President's party (Peru 2000) failed to win a majority. Events following the election indicate the government may have

⁸ A poll rated JNE a 10 out of 20 points in terms of institutional quality; ONPE received a 9. A total of 1,100 people were interviewed. The margin of error is plus/minus 3.0%. Source: *Gestión*, 20 April, 2000

cobbled together a new majority. Even if this is the case, the new bloc is not likely to be as solid as the majority that dominated the 1995-2000 Congress, and thus not as successful in blocking minority influence in legislative debate and policymaking as it has been over the past five years. Opposition parties that hold a larger share of the seats in the new Congress also have more public support than in 1995-2000. A larger, less fragmented minority could make the new Congress a more important forum for debate, a source of initiative for reform, an institution capable of fulfilling oversight functions, and a channel for participation.

Third, the perception the government was disposed to commit fraud, true or not, triggered a wave of mobilizations in Peru's largest cities. While related to the mobilizations, the elections and the controversy surrounding them are symptomatic of underlying public distrust of institutions. The 2000 elections are a *fait accompli*, but the institutional issues underlying the antigovernment protest (identified in the D&G report) – executive predominance, centralization, the perceived influence of the Intelligence Service, the lack of an autonomous Congress, judicial branch corruption, weak trust in electoral institutions – remain. They may continue to fuel discontent that manifests itself in violence. Concrete reforms can defuse tensions that could lead to violence.

While the mobilizations have begun to peter out, as has the early, fervent support for Toledo, disgust with the government remains high, particularly among youth in urban areas. Whatever Peruvians think of him now (his popularity is slipping), Toledo is the most visible opposition leader, the initiator of the “Cuatro Suyos” demonstrations slated to coincide with Fujimori's inauguration on July 28, 2000. As such, his public behavior must be factored in Peru's vulnerability to civil unrest. His actions and words thus far suggest Toledo is committed to peaceful participation, though the jury is still out.

Fourth, the elections have generated new constraints or opportunities in terms of working with government institutions, that have implications for the current emphasis on working with civil society groups. In the short term, opposition protests, the public clamor for institutional reform, and the need for the government to re-establish its legitimacy in the wake of the electoral process, seem to point the way toward an opportunity for a political opening.

Fifth, this electoral process produced a government that is politically weaker, and arguably more susceptible to elite-level instability. Experts felt that the possibility of a military seizure of power was remote. Slightly more likely, but still considered low probability, were (a) a repeat *autogolpe*, and (b) an intramilitary dispute between loyalist (pro-government) officers and institutionalist mid-rank officers. The *autogolpe* scenario seems remote, now that the government has regained the parliamentary majority it lost in the election through back-door negotiations. The latter scenario seems unlikely to boil over into instability, given the government's past success in heading off dissent within the military and maintaining the loyalty of its leadership.

Disaffected Youth

(+ civil unrest, + internal war, + anomic violence)

Youth and particularly university students appeared to be playing a protagonist role in mobilizing anti-government protests in many areas of the country. These protests have been as remarkable for their peacefulness as for their size and spontaneity, in the best traditions of collective action. If there is a greater likelihood of peaceful change amid mass protest, there is also a downside risk

that protests will turn violent. The “tipping events” that transform peaceful protest into violence include provocation, disproportionate police response, or military crackdown during a rally.

Because of the role that students played in post-election protest, it made sense to interview students on their attitudes toward the government and regarding protest as a means to achieve political ends. Toward this end, this assessment included a survey of students attending a Toledo rally in the plaza San Martín in the heart of downtown Lima, following the runoff election. It also included surveys of young people in Huancayo and Iquitos a few weeks after the intense mobilizations that ensued in the election’s aftermath. In the latter two cities, the investigator held focus groups to discuss issues and and elicit opinions about conflict likelihood.

Lima: Immediate Post-Election Survey

Of the 75 demonstrators polled at the Lima rally on May 28, 2000, the majority expressed pacifist sentiments. A minority (5 respondents of 75, or 7%) felt the goals they sought could not be achieved by peaceful protest. (Table 5) While they had no intention of demonstrating in any way other than peacefully, respondents feared the government would provoke a confrontation to create a pretext for a crackdown, or they worried a demonstrator would do something to force a harsh police response.

Table 5: Survey of Student Demonstrators in Lima Following May 28, 2000 Runoff

Question: *Can the reforms you seek be achieved through peaceful protest alone?*

Response	Number	Percent
Yes	57	76%
No	5	7%
Don't Know/No Opinion	13	17%
Total	75	100%

Source: Author survey, Lima May 28, 2000. N=75; margin of error is plus/minus 6%.

Sample included students from one public one private university, San Marcos and La Católica.

Focus Group Surveys: Sample Frame⁹

Huancayo, June 13, 2000 Focus Group Age Range: 20-33	
Organization/Institution	# Representatives
Frente Juvenil en Contra de la Dictadura en Huancayo	2
Frente Cívico	1
Universidad Nacional del Centro del Perú	4
La Universidad Privada Los Andes (UPLA)	3
Iquitos, June 16, 2000 Focus Group, Age Range 19-26	
Organization/Institution	# Representatives
Frente Patriótico de Loreto (FPL)	2
Universidad Nacional de la Amazonia Peruana (NAP)	4
Universidad Particular de Iquitos (UPI)	4

Table 6: Focus Group Survey Part 1: *Conflict Vulnerability*

Question	Huancayo			Iquitos		
	Yes	No	DK/NO	Yes	No	DK/NO
Armed conflict likely within 5 years?	3	6	1	4	6	0
Civil unrest likely within 5 years?	10	0	0	9	0	1
Criminal violence in next 5 years?	10	0	0	9	1	0
Can the goals you seek be achieved through peaceful protest?	4	5	1	2	7	1

⁹ This is not a random sample, nor intended to be. The object was to get a more complete view of the political situation and the diversity of opinion regarding conflict, and the opinions of university students.

Table 7: Focus Group Survey: Part 2: Grievances

What is/are your main complaint(s)?	# Mention	Total N	Percent	Frequent comment summary
Government is authoritarian	18	20	90%	President Fujimori is dictatorial
Government Institutions at the service of President Fujimori	17	20	85%	PRONAA, PRONAMACHCS, CTAR, SUNAT, etc. used for political ends
Recent elections fraudulent, not transparent, not fair	16	20	80%	Falsification of petition signatures, ballot fraud, abuse of state resources in official campaign
Limited local job opportunities	15	20	75%	Lack of private investment in region, Oil company closures (Iquitos)
Judicial branch corruption	14	20	70%	Provisional judges, banality/regularity of corruption, bribes
Abuse of power by Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN)	13	20	65%	(SIN Director) Vladimiro Montesinos is power behind the throne, SIN agents perceived to be "present and observing"
Abuse of power by Police	11	20	55%	Police more abusive in wake of riots, tear gas bombs, water cannon, etc.
Central government ignores local problems, focuses only on Lima	8	20	40%	Public investment limited in region, used for political ends only
Abuse of power by Armed Forces	7	20	35%	Fear of military involvement in wake of mobilizations
Government repressive	6	20	30%	Media manipulated by government, open signal television "taken over" by government, harassment of newspaper and radio journalists
Central government thwarts local governance	6	20	30%	Government is centralized, centralist, unwilling to cede autonomy to regional, municipal governments
Poverty, hunger ignored by authorities	5	20	25%	Food assistance, poverty alleviation insufficient in region
Nationalism: Government sold out to foreign interests	4	20	20%	Treaty with Ecuador (ceding of Tiwinza) in Iquitos

Tables 6 and 7 summarize the results of focus groups in Huancayo and Iquitos held in June 2000. Students mainly concurred with experts on the overall probabilities that various conflict scenarios would materialize in the next five years. Most felt a resurgence of armed conflict was unlikely, and that civil unrest and anomic violence were more likely over the next five years. Grievances often cited by the respondents centered on features of the government and institutions, the elections, and their economic situations. (Table 7)

General Government Disaffection

(+ Civil Unrest, + Internal War, + Anomic Violence)

Most of the students interviewed indicated they had spoiled ballots to signal their disapproval of the election and/or the President. Indeed, the null and blank vote may be interpreted as one indicator of disaffection with the government. At 31 percent (29.93% spoiled, 1.2% Blank), the null and blank votes in the 2000 runoff is unprecedented since the 1980 transition. (Table 8)

While voting figures do indicate discontent, drawing inferences about conflict from voting statistics is not straightforward. There is a weak relation between invalid voting and violence during the 1980s, but null and blank voting, also high in the 1992 elections (24%), presaged a quiescent period culminating in Fujimori's 1995 victory. Null and blank votes cannot be considered opposition votes. In addition, the invalid vote during the first round was the lowest proportion registered at any time since 1978. The reversal may indicate that the high null and blank voting expressed dissatisfaction with the process and/or outcome of the first round, a rejection of either candidate, or solidarity with the opposition boycott.

Table 8: Valid and Invalid Voting in National Elections, 1978-2000

Year	Election Type	% Valid Vote	Null / Blank % of Total Cast	Total
1978	Congress	84	16	100
1980	General	78	22	100
1985	General	86	14	100
1990	1st Round General	85	15	100
1990	Runoff	91	10	100
1992	Congress	76	24	100
1993	Referendum	91	9	100
1995	General	82	18	100
2000	1st Round General	92	8	100
2000	Runoff	69	31	100

Source: Office of National Electoral Processes (ONPE) Website

The virulence of the anti-Fujimori contingent may not augur well for stability. If the government assuages this bloc by enacting key reforms, as it has pledged to do, the risk of unrest may diminish, though anti-government sentiment will fester. Government response is a critical intervening factor in determining whether an opposition gains unity or momentum, galvanizes into a peaceful movement or degenerates into violence, prompting repression and polarization. Under pressure, Peruvian police behaved in most places with restraint. Continued restraint may prove difficult, given the risks of disturbances associated with massive, even peaceful demonstrations. The temptation to use force may be hard for authorities to resist.

Human Rights Abuses

(+ civil unrest, +internal war)

Human rights abuses are generally thought to be a conflict driver. It might be argued that the more egregious the abuse, the longer the historical memory of the abuse and the greater its potential to serve as a *cause celebre*, that by invocation can foster mobilization and, potentially, violence directed at the government.

Peru's human rights situation has improved over the last few years due to a successful campaign against terrorism, a decline in violence, and the efforts of an aggressive network of human rights organizations. Executions, disappearances and detentions and other serious violations have decreased from the 1990s, while measures enacted to combat terrorism, such as trials by "faceless judges," have been scrapped. Military courts decide cases of treason and terrorism and violations of penal process rules are still being detected in laws to process civilians in military courts. Arbitrary detention of citizens by the police and the detainees' abuse is a recurrent problem.

Intimidation or harassment campaigns allegedly promoted by authorities have also been criticized by human rights groups.

Although the situation has improved, the government's commitment to human rights is thus weaker than it could be, which carries implications for conflict. If the police or military use repression to manage dissent, or deadly force to control unruly demonstrations, it might well trigger violence.

On the other hand, Peru possesses a network of organizations whose purpose is to monitor and protect human rights, to focus international attention on and organize a societal response to human rights abuses. The government is also reliant on economic assistance from an international community that has tied aid and trade to human rights performance. Both factors constrain the government response. Analysts were divided over whether the government's human rights record would worsen or remain the same over the next five years. They tended to agree that a serious, publicized breach -- a repeat of the notorious *La Cantuta*-style assassinations, for example -- would enhance vulnerability to unrest.

Corruption

(+ civil unrest, anomic violence)

State reform has reduced the egregious patronage of previous governments, but corruption continues to be a problem. Basic legislation purports to investigate and prosecute abuses of public office, but laws on the books are weakly enforced. For example, the Penal Code, intended to prevent the use of public office for private gain, transfers responsibility for investigation of official misdeeds to the Public Ministry. It has yet to be promulgated, leaving investigative authority in police hands. Other anti-corruption initiatives within key ministries have not borne fruit.

Fighting judicial corruption was invoked by Fujimori to justify his 1992 *autogolpe*, but little progress has been made in this area. Most judges continue to be provisional, susceptible to pressure and bribery. Attempts to fight judicial corruption have ended in failure and political will is generally weak. Executive agencies, like FONCODES and PROFAM, have been attacked for their alleged uses by the government to gain electoral advantage. A set of decrees passed by Congress in 1996 eliminating oversight of public works, have not helped to shore up the integrity of the social support program whose activities in certain areas have been called into question.

Narcotrafficking is another area of corruption. Despite government efforts to cut coca cultivation, collaboration between military authorities and traffickers was pervasive in the 1990s, when an investigation implicated scores of officers for having sheltered aerial smuggling operations in the Huallaga Valley. The military managed to keep such cases out of civilian courts, where they involve allegations of terrorism, and civilian authorities were seldom allowed to conduct inquiries into military corruption. Some analysts suggest that military-trafficker collaboration has diminished, but the investigator could neither corroborate or reject the assertion.

The government has shown little will to enforce anti-corruption laws. Public pressure may force the government to enact reforms that demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law and clean up its domestic and international image. Absent reforms, corruption will continue to be kind of achilles heel for the government and a potential driver of unrest. That said, there is a general perception among institutional investors that Peru's corruption problems are less severe than those of its

neighbors. Most experts interviewed for this study, when asked about official corruption, responded with statements about abuses of power by the President and other actors, rather than the use of public office for private gain. Indeed, *Latinobarómetro* surveys show that Peru considers corruption to be a less serious problem than do Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, and Venezuela.¹⁰

Centralization

(+ civil unrest, + internal war)

Peru is one of the few South American countries that has moved toward greater centralization of authority over the past decade. The only elected governments below the central government are the 2000 or so provincial and district municipalities, most of which are wholly dependent on Executive-level budgetary authority and decision-making. Currently about 3.8% of the national budget is returned to the municipalities, the lowest figure in the Andes.¹¹ Despite the state's unwillingness to transfer resources to local control, the central government over the last decade has stepped up local spending through the Ministry of the Presidency and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Municipalities may raise revenues through property taxes, but most lack political will or capacity to collect them, particularly in municipalities with smaller tax bases.

As central government institutions expanded their activities at the local level, local officials assumed the role of lobbyists to persuade executive officials to invest in their areas and provide services. Governing party officials had a built-in advantage; opposition party officials were forced to adapt or perish at the polls for not delivering the goods. In extending its reach into the municipalities, the central government absorbed the regional level of government. One consequence is that local governments seek consensus between local elected officials, NGO's and citizens in search of coalitions to lobby for state investment.¹²

Municipalities have few independent functions as currently constituted. Almost all functions enumerated in the Municipality Law are also assigned to the regional and national levels of government. The central government has moved forward in "deconcentration" of authority, which means executive agencies can maintain local branches. But power still rests with the Executive; it does not pass to local officials who, aside from maintaining public cleanliness and running the Civil Registry legally share other activities with central government entities.

As it becomes evident that Peru's centralized system cannot meet local needs, that centralized government removes citizen control over spending, public support for decentralization is growing. For its part, the central government continues to favor increasing spending outside the capital,

¹⁰ *Latinobarómetro Resumen* (1997; 1998).

¹¹ Comparatively, Bolivian and Colombian municipalities each receive 20%. Since 1994, special taxes earmarked for municipal development are used to create a Municipal Compensation Fund. The new fund privileged District Municipalities over Provincial Municipalities. Some 20% of these funds are distributed to the Provinces and 80% to the Districts, following criteria based on population, poverty, urban development, violence and natural resources.

¹² Such experiences have been found in Piura, Cusco, Apurimac, Puno, Ayacucho, San Martin, Ancash, Arequipa and elsewhere, as well as in urban-marginal areas. Three urban experiences which have come to serve as a model for other poor urban zones are the cases of Villa Salvador, for Metropolitan Lima, and the provinces of Ilo, in the south and Cajamarca in the north. Both rural and urban experiences have had differing degrees of success, but they underscore a movement of local actors creating stronger local organizations to better mediate relations with the state.

propelling the push toward “deconcentration.” Decentralization is not likely to be enacted over the next five years. There is too much government resistance to reforms that would wrest power from the central government.

Decentralization will likely resurface as a flash point over the next five years. Traditional areas of opposition to Lima, which includes major municipalities like Trujillo, Arequipa, and Cusco, indicate a more confrontational posture vis á vis the central government, spurred by outrage over the elections. Still, the central government has proved adept at demobilizing conflict through targeted spending and other tactics. Applying a development policy that coordinates with local authorities could soften regional opposition.

Socioeconomic Factors

In the 1990s, Peru maintained fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability, complied with multilateral lenders, and privatized its entire economy. These achievements are remarkable when one recalls the economic instability and hyperinflation of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite this reversal, however, growth has slowed over the last three years. Unemployment, eroding incomes and lower growth have fueled discontent among the urban middle class. This section summarizes the findings of an empirical analysis of the conflict data with data harvested from other sources that were used to measure a host of social and economic constructs, from economic performance, unemployment and inflation to investment, trade and union activity.

Three basic analyses were performed on a pooled time series dataset cobbled together from an array of sources, notably the World Bank World Development Indicators CD (WDI), the Peruvian National Statistical and Institute (INEI) archives, the Policía Nacional del Peru (PNP), Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla (1996), and DESCO. The analysis included: (1) linear bivariate and partial regression with continuous dependent variables, in this case a variable measuring the intensity of violence in attacks and victims to operationalize the internal war construct. (Appendix B) (2) Regression on a second set of continuous dependent variables measuring annual violent crime rates, police interventions, and detentions, to operationalize anomic violence. (3) We performed logit regression on a dichotomous (0/1) variable measuring whether or not civil unrest (meeting the definition detailed above) occurred within a year. (Appendix A)

Economic Performance

(- internal war, -civil unrest, -anomic violence)

Evidence from Peru is consistent with that of other countries with respect to economic performance. In *ceteris paribus* conditions, one would expect a stronger the economy to reduce vulnerability to conflict of any kind. That said, we found no statistical relationship between certain economic performance (e.g. GDP growth) and the intensity of internal war. Nor do poverty, income inequality and dysfunctional economies— present in many countries that have no conflict -- necessarily result in civil unrest.

Rather, the relationship appears to be mediated by political and institutional factors, such as state capacity. This finding suggests what policy makers intuitively grasp: that improvement in economic performance over the next five years will reduce the vulnerability to violent conflict.

Unemployment

(+ anomic violence, + civil unrest)

A critical area will be employment generation. Unemployment in Peru is a serious problem, though perhaps not as serious as in other Latin American countries. According to OIT-*Panorama Laboral*, which conducts a household survey throughout Latin America, unemployment in Peru, while high, has diminished over the last five years. Peru's official unemployment rate is in currently the 8 percent range, putting it well behind Colombia (19%) and Venezuela (15%).

Uncertainty about employment status and public preoccupation over employment, compared with other issues, is often as important as actual employment indicators. According to the 1997-1999 *Latinobarometro* surveys, unemployment ranks at the top of the "most important problems facing Peru." Compared with other countries, Peru's unemployment and job security worries rank at the top of the list for Latin America, alongside Uruguay, notwithstanding that its unemployment rate is not among the region's highest.¹³ (Table 9)

Table: Latinobarómetro Survey 1999
What are the Principal Problems Facing Your Country?

Problem	Average	Argentina	Bolivia	Colombia	Ecuador	Mexico	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela
Unemployment.	19	29	17	16	17	14	33	36	9
Education	16	18	23	11	20	5	16	9	21
Corruption	9	12	5	11	11	13	4	3	14
Low wages	8	4	9	3	6	13	10	14	3
Poverty	7	5	12	6	10	7	8	5	6
Delinquency	7	9	3	5	6	9	4	7	11
Terrorism	7	6	2	31	5	4	5	2	3
Job Security	6	5	6	6	6	6	9	8	4
Inflation	5	0	9	4	7	13	2	3	14
Health	4	2	3	1	3	3	3	2	3
Drugs	3	5	2	2	1	1	1	3	4
Youth	3	3	2	1	3	4	4	5	1
Opportunities									
Housing	2	1	1	1	2	4	0	2	1
Environment	2	0	2	0	2	4	0	1	1
Other	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	1
No Response	1	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	4
Base (N)	11716	1196	796	1200	1200	1105	1054	1189	1200

Our analyses found a positive relationship between unemployment and civil unrest and anomic violence, such that higher unemployment or underemployment at time *t* yielded higher criminal violence in the subsequent year, and greater likelihood of civil unrest within the ensuing five-year period. (Appendix C, Selected Regression Results). An inverse relationship was found between

¹³ In 1999, 33% evaluated unemployment as the most serious problem, while 9 percent considered employment tenure the most important. *Latinobarómetro, Resumen* (1997, 1998, 1999). A possible explanation may have to do with the length of job tenure (job security), the rate of underemployment, neither of which data were collected in this study.

unemployment and the internal war variable (measured as incidents and victims of attacks perpetrated by terrorists).

Regression Analysis 1: Economic Factors and Internal War

The tables below summarize a pooled time series analysis in which a variety of macroeconomic and social/demographic indicators are regressed against a variable measuring three types of violent conflict: internal war, anomic violence and civil unrest. The last conflict type (military coup) was left out because the rarity of the event during the sample frame limited the number of cases. The findings with respect to the internal war variable are summarized thus:

- **Internal war** is operationalized as violent incidents perpetrated by terrorist movements per year, with a fixed lead effect of $t+1$, $t+2$, $T+3$, $t+4$, and $t+5$ years. A second variable was operationalized at the departmental level and analyzed separately. This variable measured the number of terrorist incidents registered annually in the department, indexed against departmental population, according to the 1993 census. It is considered the “Attack Rate.” (Table 10)

At the national level, only a few economic variables turned out to be correlated with violence, notably the rate of inflation (+. 3), employment in state-owned enterprises (+. 7), and manufacturing as a percentage of GDP; moreover, the effect of the relationship seems to grow stronger with time. One explanation for these puzzling results is that terrorism escalated during the 1980s, at the same time that manufacturing output increased, as a result of import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies promoted by the Belaúnde (1980-1985) and García (1985-1990) governments. The policy meant greater protection for domestic manufacturing, and less labor market flexibility. The result was that state enterprises became a vehicle for government patronage, resulting in a higher public sector payroll even as the economy was in recession.

Regression analysis may not indicate a cause-and-effect relationship, therefore, but a contemporaneous movement of manufacturing and state-owned enterprise variables along with violence intensity. Neither factor may have much diagnostic value with respect to internal war.

The same is true with respect to unemployment. Found to have a negative relationship to terrorist violence (higher unemployment meant less intense violence), the unemployment effect also appears to grow stronger with time. This is a counterintuitive finding; one would expect greater employment to augur a reduction in armed conflict. The employment relationship is likely mediated, making it harder to draw clear conclusions with respect to its relationship to internal war.

Findings with respect to government spending and revenue corroborate our earlier assertion that *economic performance is mediated by state capacity*. Importantly, changes in the unemployment rate were not correlated with the intensity of violence.

At the sub-national (departmental) level, a strong predictor of violence at time t was the level of invalid (null and blank) voting in elections held in the preceding years, which was taken to be a measure of political disaffection. (Table 11)

Table 10: Economic Performance and Internal War: Bivariate Correlations

Variable (X)	Pearson R Coefficient at t+3 years*
Food exports % merchandise exports	-.6
Foreign direct investment % GDP	-.5
Inflation, prices % change	+.3
Manufacturing % GDP	+.6
Private consumption	-.3
Current Revenue % GDP	-.5
State owned enterprise employment % total	+.7
strikes and lockouts, #	+.6
trade % GDP	-.1

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2000. Conflict data adapted from the Policía Nacional del Peru (PNP), Dirección de Planificación, División de Estadística, Cuánto, S.A. 1999.

*Coefficients significant at $p < .05$.

Table 11: Correlation Coefficients: Invalid (Null) Voting* with Terrorist Violence ** N=Department

Variable		Pearson R Coefficient and Significance	
		Null vote 1985 general election	Null vote 1990 general election 1st round
Rate of violence in 1986	Pearson Correlation	.7455	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.0000	
Rate of violence in 1987	Pearson Correlation	.6365	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.0008	
Rate of violence in 1988	Pearson Correlation	.6899	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.0002	
Rate of violence in 1990	Pearson Correlation	.4096	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.0468	
Rate of violence in 1991	Pearson Correlation	.4598	.4821
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.0238	.0170
Rate of violence in 1992	Pearson Correlation	.5912	.4316
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.0023	.0352
Rate of violence in 1993	Pearson Correlation	.4822	.5386
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.0170	.0066
N=24 departments			

*Source: Tuesta Soldevilla (1996; ONPE 2000)

** Policía Nacional del Peru (PNP), Dirección de Planificación, División de Estadística, Cuánto, S.A. 1999.

Regression Analysis 2: Economic Factors and Civil Unrest

- **Civil unrest** is operationalized as a binary (0/1) variable measuring whether there is an outbreak of civil unrest at any time within the ensuing five-year period. The analysis at the national level indicated, in a variety of ways, that the employment situation is a driver of civil unrest. Unemployment and underemployment at the national level is also correlated with the likelihood of unrest, while state-owned enterprise economic activity is negatively related.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was positively correlated with civil unrest, a mediated linkage rather than a direct cause-and-effect relation. Public sector layoffs and job loss associated with privatization is shown in other contexts to drive discontent, unless governments enact spending programs to buffer the effects of economic restructuring, for example. There seems little question that something similar has occurred in Peru. (Table 12)

Strike activity and man-hours lost to strike activity are also negatively related to civil unrest, a counterintuitive finding that is corroborated by the analysis of anomic violence. Performance in the export sector seems to inhibit the likelihood of civil unrest over the five-year horizon.

A model using two variables, unemployment and economic (GNP) growth, explains most of the cases of erupted conflict, including Iquitos (October 1998) and Huancayo (May 2000). The model was estimated using logit regression. (Table 13)

Table 12: Civil Unrest within 5 Years? (0/1) Economic Performance & Other Variables

All Correlation Coefficients Significant at $P < .05$

Variables	Y= Major civil unrest within 5 years? Correlation Coefficient	Sig. (2-tailed)
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)% GDP	.8595	.0000
Underemployment urban	.8161	.0004
Public spending on education % GNP	.6777	.0004
Unemployment, male % total	.6381	.0344
Labor force, female % total	.6274	.0010
Urban population % total	.5102	.0109
Government Social Spending % GDP	.3077	.0381
Aid as % GDP	-.3958	.0555
Manufacturing % GDP	-.4220	.0400
Exports % GDP	-.4575	.0246
State owned enterprise economic activity % GDP	-.4672	.0378
Military Spending as % of GDP	-.5286	.0095
Man hours lost to strike activity	-.5442	.0060
Strikes and lockouts, #	-.6348	.0009

Table 13: Economic Performance and Civil Unrest

Logit Model with Economic Growth and Unemployment as Covariates

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
UNEMPT_1	1.3938	.7907	3.1076	1	.0279	.2484	4.0301
GNPGROW	.1435	.4992	2.0937	1	.0479	.0723	1.1543
Constant	-10.8996	6.0903	3.2029	1	.0735		

*Major civil unrest within 5 years? * Predicted Group Crosstabulation*

		Predicted		Total
Observed		No	Yes	
Civil Unrest in 5 years?	No Count	5	2	7
	% within Predicted Group	83	29	54
	Yes Count	1	5	6
	% within Predicted Group	17	71	46
Total	Count	6	7	13
	% within Predicted Group	100	100	100

Regression Analysis 3: Economic Factors and Anomic Violence

Anomic violence is operationalized as the numbers of violent crimes involving police intervention on an annual basis. We found that both urban population density and unemployment is correlated with the anomic violence variable at time t as well as with the variable with a lead effect of one year. Government consumption and labor strike activity appeared to be mediating variables. (Table 14)


The inverse relation between labor unrest and anomic violence, again, was an intriguing and perhaps counterintuitive finding, but appeared robust across lead periods on the dependent variables. These results may have more to do with the historical period under study than with any cause-and-effect relation that is generalizable across time or countries.

Table 14: Economic Performance & Anomic Violence: Bivariate Correlations

Variable (X)	Pearson R Coefficient at t
Govt. consumption % GDP	-.49
Unemployment Rate with linear interpolation MTPS	+.74
Urban Population Percentage	+.67
Pearson R Coefficient at $t+1$	
Urban Population Percentage	+.55
Govt. consumption % GDP	-.65
Man hours lost to strike activity	-.47
Strikes and lockouts, #	-.54
Unemployment Rate with linear interpolation MTPS	.74
Coefficients significant at $p < .01$	

Figure 8: Strike Activity in Peru, 1976-98

Source: UN International Labour Office (ILO)



Thus, there is no basis for concluding labor unrest will worsen if economic conditions remain the same. As noted, our analysis demonstrated an inverse correlation between strikes and civil unrest. This finding does not suggest that labor stability *drives* conflict. Rather, the relation appears to be mediated by other factors that require more in-depth analysis.

Ethnicity/Discrimination

(Indeterminate)

The exclusion of the poor and nonwhite majority from political and social power has been a historical barrier in Peru. Since the 1970s, advances have been made in the direction of inclusion, with access to education, expanded civil society organization, and elimination of most formal barriers to participation. Today there are no legal barriers to participation. Adult suffrage is universal and obligatory. In the past two decades there has been an increase in mayors, city council members, congressional candidates and even presidential aspirants, who come from humble backgrounds or are of mixed race.

Practical barriers remain to millions of Peruvians in the public decisions and institutions that affect their lives. Poverty, illiteracy and the low *quality* of education are barriers to participation and to their assumption of leadership positions. Peasant women and indigenous and native populations remain the most excluded, due to linguistic and cultural barriers. Racism and other forms of discrimination are pervasive in society and in the labor market. One of the criticisms of the political parties of the 1980s was the lack of ethnic and cultural diversity among their leadership, a fact that Fujimori (of Asian descent) used to his advantage.

The issue of ethnicity crops up during election campaigns as happened in the recent elections when Toledo, an ethnic “cholo” (a colloquial term referring to an intermediate category between indigenous and white/European) made appeals to voters based on race, with slogans such as “Toledo: A Peruvian Like You.” Ethnicity has not proved to be a salient category for mobilizing

Labor Stability

(- civil unrest, - anomic violence)

Peru’s unions have weakened since the 1980s. Privatization coupled with labor “flexibilization” measures and the erosion of labor parties (APRA, IU) have all undermined collective bargaining, reducing strike activity. (Figure 8) While labor unrest intensified during the privatization of PetroPeru in 1995-96, strike activity has been on a declining trend since 1988 and has continued to decline to historic lows.

Unions will not likely re-emerge as influential actors in the next five years.

dissent in Peru, even less so as a rallying point around which movements have organized armed campaigns.

- Sendero Luminoso, which launched armed activities in a region with a large, Quechua-speaking population, made class-based rather than racial appeals. Its structure replicated the racial hierarchy of Peru's political class in microcosm, with educated white leaders in leadership positions and *mestizos* in the rank and file. SL did, however, incorporate women in its highest leadership positions.
- The MRTA, for its part, takes its name from the leader of Peru's bloodiest (and last major) indigenous conflict, Tupac Amaru. Yet, its following consists of university-educated leftists of mixed race and its ideology avoids discourse about ethnicity.

Ethnic exclusion, in sum, may be a source of conflict but it has not driven internal war, civil unrest or other violent conflicts in Peru for the last two centuries. It seems unlikely that ethnicity by itself will fuel new outbreaks of violent conflict over the next five years. Indeed, the majority of the indigenous population currently backs the government alongside a significant proportion of the mixed race population. Support for Toledo, paradoxically, comes from the urban *mestizo* middle classes, suggesting that efforts to exploit the race issue failed to mobilize anti-government sentiment along racial lines. Ethnicity tends to become a conflict flash point the pattern of inequality in a society is one that discriminates between ethnic groups' by differentiating access to political and economic resources. If anything, the last three decades have shown some improvement in this regard.

Illicit Narcotics Industry

(coca/cocaine prices/production + internal war, + anomic violence)


A major factor in Peru's economy and also a major job source, the illicit production of coca, coca paste and cocaine had and will continue to have an impact on conflict vulnerability. Peru's main

coca-producing region, the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) was the proverbial power vacuum during the 1980s: traffickers ran rampant, used bribes and coercion to secure immunity, and employed hired guns to force farmers to deliver coca at low prices, under threats of death.

Amid this disorder, Sendero Luminoso established control over the region in 1987 and performed state-like functions, from protection, 'law' enforcement, to conscription and taxation. Its relations with the local population were symbiotic. SL forced traffickers to pay higher prices for coca and provided armed protection for local producers.

Figure 9: Coca Leaf Prices in Peru in \$US/kg

Source: CAJPE



Territorial control afforded SL access to hard currency. In exchange for access to airstrips, drug pilots paid SL's landing fees, funds used to buy food and weapons. Coca thus allowed SL to consolidate a regional base and project a national presence as eradication efforts carried out by the Special Project for Coca Reduction in the Upper Huallaga (CORAH) during this period strengthened the alliance between SL and coca producers, increasing violent incidents and victims in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Market forces and policy changes altered the situation in the UHV over the last decade. A drop in coca prices between 1992 and 1997, due to overproduction and aerial interdiction -- the disruption of the flow of drugs and chemical precursors via the "airbridge", the aviation conduit used to smuggle cocaine paste to labs in Colombia -- dispersed production from the main coca enclave to mini-enclaves in the lower jungle, reduced illicit cultivation,¹⁴ and proliferated alternate smuggling routes.¹⁵ New routes coupled with dropping prices contributed to greater vertical integration of the market, or reduced cross-border traffic of raw materials. Peru now manufactures greater quantities of cocaine and competes in the more lucrative cocaine distribution markets. Increasing cocaine availability within Peru has dropped the domestic price of cocaine, spurring domestic consumption, a trend analysts attribute to a rising crime rate.

The bust in coca prices had a negative impact upon violence. Falling prices combined with declining air traffic deprived SL of millions of dollars in lost revenues while proliferating smuggling routes reduced the dependency of cultivators on terrorist intervention, sapping SL of support and protection profits. Cultivation dispersal made SL control less feasible, since new cultivation areas had greater civic organization, stronger ties to the state and diverse economic bases. A consequence of the terrorist-*coca* rupture was a decline in terrorist attacks and fatalities.

As Figure 9 and Table 15 illustrate, however, coca prices have recovered from their nadir in 1996, a fact that may have a corrosive effect on the rule of law. Table 14 indicates that coca's price recovery has varied geographically. The recovery has been robust in the Upper Huallaga-Tingo María area. Even Pichis Pachitea and the Apurímac Valley, which had seen declining prices since 1995 experienced a surge in 1999.

Table 15: Average Price of Coca Leaf by Geographic Area (US\$ per Kg.)*

Geographic Area	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Central Huallaga	1.22	1.30	0.99	0.68	1.59
Alto Huallaga-Tocache	1.25	1.07	0.73	1.09	1.75
Alto Huallaga-Tingo Maria-Monzon	1.24	1.19	0.96	1.52	2.18
Aguaytia	1.24	1.13	0.82	0.96	1.46

¹⁴ Cultivation was reduced from 129,000 hectares in 1992 to 95,700 hectares in 1997, to 38,700 hectares in 1999. CNC (2000) "Peru" 1999 Coca Estimates."

¹⁵ Traffickers use ground, maritime, lake and river routes to deliver paste to labs in and outside Peru. Boats transport coca paste along Amazon routes across the borders. Ground and maritime traffic has intensified as traffickers transport larger quantities of coca paste by truck to the coast, through the Andes to Pisco and Lima. Overland shipments reaching the coast are transported to offshore barges, processed into cocaine, and then shipped to distribution networks. Low-volume "ant traffic" -- couriers transporting cocaine across borders -- is also on the rise.

Pichis-Pachitea	1.24	1.21	0.91	0.92	1.86
Valle del Rio Apurimac	1.24	1.21	0.91	0.92	1.86
National Average	1.23	1.18	0.89	1.01	1.78

*Source: Data provided by CNC.

Whether rebounding coca prices will affect Peru's vulnerability to internal war over the next five years is unclear. A few experts noted that "Red" Sendero, the faction opposed to Guzmán's rapprochement with the Government, is among the actors offering protection to producers and traffickers in exchange for payments in the Apurimac Valley and elsewhere. These terrorist-trafficker ties are a far cry from the support base SL established in the 1980s. Current arrangements seem primarily a subsistence strategy, a way to avoid military defeat.

It is hard to conceive of the coca economy as anything other than a deleterious influence on the rule of law, and a source of susceptibility to *criminal violence*, if not violence with a political agenda. Recovering coca prices will likely contribute to anomic violence over the next five years, though illicit production seems to be on a declining trend.

Coca price and production are not likely to be a factor in fueling civil unrest, as civil unrest seems primarily to be driven by other political and economic factors. One factor which could increase Peru's susceptibility to both armed conflict *and civil unrest* is the resumption of forced eradication by the GOP. Considered a faster way to achieve reduction targets, forced eradication generated conflict between eradicators and coca producers in the 1980s. The strategy shift may exacerbate tensions in Huánuco and San Martín, both of which experienced street protests in response to the government's Ley de la Amazonía and the perception that there was fraud in recent elections.

Players and Their Interests: Parties to Conflict, Those Interested in Managing It

- *Sendero Luminoso*: SL still maintains a sporadic and weak presence in some areas. Its main interest is surviving until conditions permit a renewal of the armed struggle. The organization will not likely recover support within the next five years, as most Peruvians repudiate its ideology and aims. SL may fester at low intensity, perhaps garnering incomes through the drug trade, but the group is not likely to pose a threat to regime stability in the next five years.
- *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru*: Never strong to begin with, the MRTA has all but disappeared from the political landscape following its unsuccessful hostage-taking operation and siege of the Japanese Ambassador's residence in 1996-1997. This group is not likely to experience resurgence over the next five years. On the other hand, if there is a resurgence of terrorist activity, it will more likely resemble the MRTA than Sendero Luminoso, as its likely base would be urban-based *universitarios*.

Experts were hard-pressed to conceive of circumstances in which urban-based *universitarios* would come to embrace the terrorist and/or guerrilla path. Eduardo Toche and Carlos Reyna, both of DESCO, suggested that recent rhetoric used by the student-based movements in Huancayo and Arequipa ("*Si no hay democracia, habra revolución*") indicates a predisposition to armed conflict that could harden depending on the government's actions. In conversations with *universitarios* in Huancayo and Iquitos, the investigator found little evidence to warrant such a conclusion, though it was impossible to rule out the possibility.

- *The State*: The “State” is intended to encompass government institutions and head of state, as well as the military, police and National Intelligence Services. An obvious party to and target of any potential conflict, the State has an obvious interest in maintaining public order. Its ability to do so depends on its capacity across all four dimensions described above. Key variables signaling state weakness include shortfalls in revenue, relative declines in public sector (including police and military) salaries and an unraveling of the civil defense committee system. Civil-military relations are critical to the maintenance of public order. Indications that the relationship between the President and the Armed Forces is becoming conflictive and unstable may augur greater vulnerability to internal war, civil unrest, and a military coup.
- *Alberto Fujimori*: The President’s reputation stems in large part from his proven ability to restore and preserve public order. He is interested in protecting his legacy over the next five years. His primary interest over the last several years seems to have been to win re-election to a third term. Now that this goal has been achieved, he is under pressure to preempt against civil unrest. He might do so by adopting a conciliatory posture with respect to the opposition, or by enacting delayed reforms that reassure internal and external actors that his government is moving in a democratic direction.

In public statements, the President indicated he is disposed to initiate a dialogue with opposition figures, including the formation of a committee whose charge is to propose measures aimed at judicial reform. The President also hinted at an overhaul of the electoral law creating *the distrito unico* in favor of a system of multiple districts and a “redimensioning” of the National Intelligence Services. If implemented, these reforms could slow opposition momentum and reduce vulnerability to civil unrest.

The cynical view holds that President Fujimori will make only cosmetic adjustments without producing genuine reform, a scenario that will not reduce conflict vulnerability. In the worst case scenario, Fujimori will seize on the opportunity to use repressive force in response to violence provoked by demonstrators to demonstrate the need for a *mano dura*. At the moment, it seems unlikely that Fujimori will seek a fourth term, but it is impossible to rule out the possibility, given a scenario of unrest and social disorder. If military intervention to preserve order becomes necessary again, most Peruvians would arguably prefer a civil-military alliance led by the incumbent to a military coup d’etat and the restoration of military rule.

- *Anti-Government Opposition*: This group includes the student demonstrators who turned out *en masse* at demonstrations in the plazas of Lima, Arequipa, Chimbote, Huancayo, Cusco and other cities. This group is both a potential party to civil unrest and a group that has expressed an interest in managing conflict.
- *Alejandro Toledo*: As spokesman for the opposition Toledo is interested in driving Fujimori out of office and assuming the mantle of the presidency, a right he feels he was denied by government fraud. As he mobilizes opinion in Peru in favor of a new election, the candidate will play a key role in channeling regime disaffection and anger toward the government into peaceful

protest and agitation for democratic change. Toledo and his supporters can play a crucial role in consolidating his independent movement, Peru Posible, into a party with solid bases of support and viability in elections. In public statements, Toledo appears committed to peaceful protest. However, Toledo could unwittingly incite his followers to commit acts of violence, despite the fact that he himself has explicitly disavowed violence. Trends also indicate that his decline in support is attributable to what many perceive as his penchant for inflammatory rhetoric.

- *US Government Agencies* (including USAID) and other governments, including the European Union. Continued support for civil society organizations in Peru, combined with support for initiatives such as alternative development can help to mitigate conflict, and use its support for NGOs in conjunction with public diplomacy to exert pressure on the next Fujimori government to enact reforms. The US Government could push for the application of sanctions to signal its displeasure with the government's conduct during the electoral process, but this seems unlikely.
- *The Organization of American States* (OAS) could play a role in encouraging Peru to enact institutional reforms, especially in light of the recommendations made by the Gaviria-Axworthy High Level OAS Mission to the GOP, many of which seem to have met with acceptance and follow-on actions by government officials. These have included concrete reform proposals, initiatives to stimulate public debate, and proposals to jump-start judicial reforms. The OAS can keep open the channels with government and promote reconciliation between government and members of the political opposition, all of which could reduce conflict vulnerability.
- *The International Financial Community* (IMF, World Bank and other multilaterals) may play a role in mitigating conflict vulnerability over the next five years. While lenders are on the whole inclined to be supportive of a government that has practiced sound macroeconomic management in the past, they are also wary of collaborating with a government that many Peruvians feel is illegitimate. Moreover, they are reluctant to finance development projects sponsored by government agencies that have been used for political ends, such as the MIPRE-linked development agencies. The World Bank, for its part, has already withdrawn certain loans to pressure the government into pursuing institutional reforms, though this has not yet had much of an effect on government policy. One might expect similar conditionality from other lenders.

Regions Likely to Experience Violent Conflict

As suggested above, the regions *least* likely to experience a resurgence of armed conflict are the rural and urban areas that were battlegrounds or bastions of terrorist support in the 1980s and early 1990s. It is those areas in which the government has concentrated economic resources and focused its pacification strategy, both of which have had an enduring impact on conflict vulnerability. State capacity in those areas has dramatically increased over the last several years, and pacification has also enabled a proliferation of civil society organizations to take root. The development of civil society organizations in particular is a barrier to a revival of armed conflict.


On the other hand the regions most vulnerable to *civil unrest* are shaded in red in Figure 10. They include the departments of Lima (the city of Lima), Ancash (Chimbote), Loreto (Iquitos), Junín (Huancaayo), Cusco (Cusco), Lambayeque (Chiclayo) and Arequipa (Arequipa). It is these areas

in which mobilizations during and after the elections have occurred, and in which civil unrest is most likely to erupt. Two outliers are Lima and Junín, both of which experienced terrorist violence during the 1980s and 1990s, and yet appear vulnerable to unrest over the next five years. Areas of medium and low risk are shaded in green and yellow respectively.

Table 16 shows violence-prone areas during the terrorist conflict, and the areas most vulnerable to forms of conflict over the next five years. These ratings are derived from case studies, site visits, expert opinion, as well as by empirical analysis at the departmental level.

- The formula for determining vulnerability to internal war is based on qualitative assessment of the strength of the state in the region of interest, the degree of disaffection with the government, the strength of civil society organizations that play an order enforcing role (such as civil defense patrols) and the size and projected economic importance of illicit economic activity.

Figure 10: Areas of Vulnerability to Civil Unrest



The formula for determining vulnerability to civil unrest is based on the factors (drivers/inhibitors) deemed highly diagnostic (as drivers/inhibitors) by the empirical analysis. They include unemployment, local disaffection with government (measured in invalid voting), whether police or military forces committed recent human rights abuses, and the departmental economic situation (unemployment rate, per capita departmental income). An additional factor weighed into the predicted score was the university population, which, absent departmental data, was considered a discrete variable (small, medium, and large).

- The formula for computing vulnerability to anomic violence is based on the size of the urban population of the department (as a ratio of the total departmental population), the departmental level of unemployment and per capita GDP and income.

Table 16: Departments Affected by Violence, 1980-98 & 5-Year Conflict Vulnerability

<i>Department</i>	<i>Total Incidents (1980-1998)</i>	<i>Degree Affected by Past Violence</i>	<i>Vulnerability to Internal War</i>	<i>Vulnerability to Civil Unrest</i>	<i>Vulnerability to Anomic Violence</i>
Lima Metrop.	9832	High	Low	High	High
Ayacucho	4725	High	Low	Low	Low
Junin	3319	High	Medium	High	High
Huancavelica	1600	High	Low	Low	Low
Ancash	1385	High	Low	High	High
La Libertad	1344	High	Low	Low	High
Puno	1256	High	Low	Low	Low
Pasco	1162	High	Low	Low	Low
San Martin	1094	High	Medium	Medium	Medium
Huanuco	1049	High	Medium	Medium	Medium
Cusco	771	Moderate	Low	High	Medium
Apurimac	755	Moderate	Medium	Low	Medium
Cajamarca	721	Moderate	Low	Low	Low
Arequipa	707	Moderate	Low	High	High
Lambayeque	662	Moderate	Low	High	High
Piura	473	Moderate	Low	Medium	Medium
Ica	415	Moderate	Low	Low	Medium
Ucayali	368	Moderate	Low	Medium	Low
Loreto	157	Minimal	Medium	High	High
Amazonas	131	Minimal	Low	Low	Low
Tacna	131	Minimal	Low	Medium	Medium
Tumbes	57	Minimal	Low	Low	Medium
Madre de Dios	31	Minimal	Low	Low	Low
Moquegua	10	Minimal	Low	Low	Low

The departmental projections are incomplete in part because of time and data limitations. The investigator visited a few, pre-selected regions deemed vulnerable to conflict and did not have the opportunity to interview experts and others in other key areas, especially Arequipa, Chimbote, Trujillo and Chiclayo, as well as “control” areas deemed less vulnerable. The projections can thus be strengthened by additional site visits and data collection in Peru.

Data collection at the sub-national level is also incomplete. There was insufficient time and resources to develop a larger dataset at that level that incorporated and measured the full range of conflict drivers and inhibitors identified as having high diagnostic value at the state level of analysis. The projections can thus be strengthened by completing the compilation of time series data in which the department/year serves as the unit of analysis. Once the dataset is complete, the investigator can test a larger range of propositions and develop a conflict vulnerability forecasting tool that is sensitive to the regional context and therefore of more use to USAID in the formulation of regional conflict prevention strategies.

Summary of Findings, General

Summarized below are the findings with respect to Peru's vulnerability to conflict over the next five years, based on a survey and filtered through an empirical analysis of drivers and inhibitors identified in the above analysis:

1. *Vulnerability to resurgence armed conflict led by SL and/or MRTA is low.*
2. *Vulnerability to an outbreak of warfare led by other actors is low*
3. *Vulnerability to an outbreak of sustained, violent civil unrest is high.*
4. *Vulnerability to a military coup over the next five years is low.*
5. *Vulnerability to anomic social violence is high.*

We found that key drivers of conflict in the Peruvian case included primarily macroeconomic and government finance factors, from unemployment to investment to inflation, and the capacity of the government to co-opt, control or demobilize conflict through spending. We also found that certain governance factors rendered Peru less susceptible to internal war over the next five years. These factors include the general fiscal health of the state, the strength of the regime, its military support, and its links with the civil defense patrols in highland areas. On the other hand, we found that increasing public disaffection with and declining trust in political institutions, from the Congress to the judiciary to the media to the police – exacerbated by the recent elections -- rendered the country extraordinarily vulnerable to outbreaks of civil unrest.

A worrisome finding is the high degree of vulnerability to civil unrest. If the general political-economic climate lingers we would predict repetitions of events that have occurred in places like Iquitos and Huancayo, where protesters attacked or set fire to government buildings, leading to confrontations with local police. We might also expect a strengthening of regional security measures, such as increased military protection of government properties, as occurred in the wake of demonstrations in certain cities. In the longer term, the intensification of violent civil unrest could itself be a factor with independent effects on vulnerability to internal war.

There are few surprises with respect to regional conflict vulnerability. The overall probability of a resurgence or new outbreak of armed conflict in Peru is deemed to be low, but higher relative to other regions in Junín, San Martín, Huánuco, Apurímac, and Loreto. Loreto is an interesting outlier in that it was one of the areas least affected by terrorist violence during the 1980s and was found to have medium vulnerability to armed conflict. This finding is partly the result of the weight accorded government dissatisfaction in the overall computation of the results.

Indeed, this finding is consistent with the qualitative analysis, which included a focus group session in which a member of the *Frente Patriótico de Loreto (FPL)* participated. While the department of Loreto has a weak tradition of violent resistance, the *Frente Patriótico de Loreto* has apparently begun to contemplate armed actions against government targets as a means of signaling its unhappiness with the peace agreement with Ecuador. The part of the agreement

which especially angers FPL militants is the provision permitting the construction of Ecuadorian commercial and navigation centers on Peruvian soil.¹⁶

The investigator did not detect much sympathy for the FPL's hard line, especially among the region's important university student population. But the FPL has a high mobilization capacity (*capacidad convocatoria*), in terms of human resources and is capable of turning out multitudes for local rallies that have filled the main plaza in Iquitos, for example. It is not clear what economic resources they might have at their disposal to finance armed actions. The FPL would also be able to count on alliances not only within Loreto, but also across regions, if it were to initiate armed actions. Its motivating force seems to be not only opposition to the government but also *nationalism* -- rather than any specific political ideology -- which is itself a very powerful mobilizing force. It is doubtful the *Fuerza Loretana*, the political party alternative committed to peaceful participation, would ally with the FPL in the event the latter initiated armed actions.

Our findings with respect to coup vulnerability receive short shrift in this assessment. This is not primarily because experts deemed its likelihood was low. Rather, it is because the empirical analysis was limited by the lack of cases. A strategy for identifying factors that enhance or reduce vulnerability to a coup is a cross national (rather than a single case) study. A substantial body of literature identifies a host of factors with predictive value with respect to coups. It would make sense to apply these empirically validated models to Peru to determine whether or not coup vulnerability is higher for the succeeding five-year period that it has been in the past.

Summary of Findings, Regional

Our findings with respect to regional vulnerability to civil unrest are as follows: areas of high vulnerability are cities in the departments of Lima (Lima), Junín (Huancayo), Arequipa (Arequipa), Ancash (Chimbote), Lambayeque (Chiclayo), Loreto (Iquitos). Junín is an interesting outlier. The central highland departments hardest-hit by violence during the 1980s, with the exception of Junín, have transformed into bastions of government support and are therefore at the lowest risk of civil unrest. These departments include Ayacucho, Apurímac, Huancavelica, and Pasco. Unlike these other highland departments, Junín possesses, in Huancayo, a large urban commercial center with a significant university population.

Iquitos is especially vulnerable to outbreaks of sustained, violent unrest over the next five years. Economic factors combined with a history of regionalism dominated by issues of sovereignty and nationalism brought to the surface following the pact 1998 with Ecuador make the situation there extremely volatile. The tensions that have arisen between the civilian population of Iquitos and the police in the wake of the election protests and the October 1998 demonstrations against the peace accord have created an atmosphere both palpable and precarious.

San Martín is pegged at medium vulnerability to civil unrest despite the fact that it is a region in which USAID alternative development and local governance resources have been concentrated. This is due to the intensification of opposition to the central government over the La Ley de la Amazonía in Tarapoto (Appendix F). As noted, the shift in the GOP strategy to forced eradication might increase susceptibility to civil unrest even further in the Upper Huallaga

¹⁶ Communicated during the focus group sessions in Iquitos by a FPL member, who will remain anonymous.

Valley, particularly in the context of a coca price recovery that makes coca production more attractive relative to legal alternatives. To the extent that organized, armed groups continue to serve a protective function for local coca producers, the strategy might also, in the longer term – beyond five years – increase the likelihood of a resurgence of armed conflict directed against eradication authorities in the region.

Finally, the areas that were found to be of highest vulnerability to anomic violence are, not surprisingly the more urban areas: Lima, Junín, Ancash (Chimbote), La Libertad (Trujillo), Arequipa, Lambayeque (Chiclayo) and Loreto (Iquitos). The factors that seem to be driving the increase in criminality are primarily economic.

Strategic Recommendations

In light of the analysis of drivers and inhibitors of conflict, we can now identify several areas for priority attention in conflict prevention strategies. Among the major drivers, economic factors -- primarily unemployment, underemployment and slow economic growth -- were found to have a strong relationship both to the outbreak of civil unrest and the intensity of anomic violence. We also found that the performance of key institutions and the public perception of their performance (confidence in electoral and judicial institutions, the degree of disaffection with government), play a major role in prompting the mobilizations that currently put Peru at risk for an eruption of violent civil unrest. We found, moreover, that state capacity plays an important inhibiting role in all forms of conflict. As for geographic areas, we found that Iquitos and many of Peru's larger urban areas to be of higher vulnerability to civil unrest and anomic violence.

We therefore recommend that USAID-Peru contemplate the following kinds of strategies in order to reduce vulnerability to the two most likely forms of conflict, *civil unrest* and *anomic violence*. Since the main conflict drivers appear to be economic and government finance factors, efforts to assist Peru in developing productive private sector employment could advance USAID objectives in reducing conflict vulnerability. Since the main governance issues are those that relate to the competence, independence, integrity and capacity of political institutions, USAID would be well served by supporting internal and international efforts aimed at restoring independence and capacity to key institutions, including, notably, the judicial branch and the election agencies.

Many of USAID's strategic objectives seem sensible, and are liable, in conjunction with a stronger push for reform within the government and among civil society, to reduce conflict vulnerability. However, we propose additional recommendations that would also advance USAID's goals. Some are natural extensions of the empirical findings of this study, while others reiterate the suggestions made in the D&G Assessment, submitted in March 2000.

1. To the extent that economic performance and particularly employment has been identified as a major factor contributing to conflict vulnerability, *USAID should continue or augment efforts to promote economic development assistance in Peru* and particularly those measures aimed at generating long-term, productive employment.

These efforts could include (1) Extending support for alternative development in coca growing regions, including continuing developing the infrastructure necessary to create an export base for legal alternatives to coca. Success in these efforts will be crucial in light of the

increase in the price of coca. (2) Increasing support for private sector development and private investment in provincial areas and encouraging the microenterprise sector.

Government policy that has a net positive effect on employment in urban areas and therefore contributes to an expansion of economic opportunities for young people will reduce one of the primary factors driving Peru's vulnerability to conflict over the next five years.

It ultimately falls upon Peru's public and private sector, not the donor community, to promote sustainable growth that yields gains in employment needed to reduce conflict vulnerability. All serious candidates for the presidency in the recent elections articulated economic policies intended to steer Peru out of its current recession and promote reactivation and job creation. Although President Fujimori has not yet detailed the means by which his government will produce employment-generating growth, there is no question but that his government could go a long way toward reducing conflict vulnerability by satisfying demands for permanent, productive employment. If the government fails to create jobs during the next five years, a combination of frustration and dashed expectations will enhance conflict vulnerability.

Job creation through spending on public works may not be a sustainable solution, though it is an obvious recourse, since it has been a time-tested method for courting the popular vote. Peru will have to find a viable long-term strategy that does not rely on reactivation through spending. Populist policies may ultimately shrink state resources and weaken government's vaunted capacity to preserve order and fulfill other key functions, increasing opportunities for violence.

To the extent that an economic policy initiative aimed at creating employment opportunities succeeds, the government will have gone part way toward ameliorating the conditions rendering Peru susceptible to violence. Coupled with institutional reforms, improvement in the employment outlook could weaken anti-government sentiment and restore some lost public confidence in institutions, allowing Peru to move forward out of a sensitive and uncertain political context toward greater stability.

2. *Support and Monitor Institutional Reform Initiatives.* The High Level OAS mission (Gaviria and Axworthy) recently proposed a set of institutional reforms that could be undertaken in the short term (Appendix E), involving concrete government actions as well as dialogue and collaboration with the political opposition and civil society organizations. These include reestablishing the independence of the Judiciary, strengthening the rule of law and separation of powers, ensuring adequate protection of human rights and press freedom, and reforming the electoral system. Transparencia has produced a similar set of proposals, all of which are aimed at the "re-institutionalization" of key government entities, including the Constitutional Tribunal, and the *Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura*.

Many items on the reform checklist provided by the Gaviria-Axworthy mission are by definition legislative initiatives, and must originate in or pass through the Congress. Therefore, USAID could also reduce conflict vulnerability by supporting NGO efforts to track the progress of reform bills in order to identify the obstacles obstructing the path to policy. USAID would then be better able to make a determination about whether it is prudent to change its posture with respect to legislative strengthening and support.

Early acceptance by government as well as opposition of the OAS proposals is encouraging, but it is too early to tell whether there is a genuine commitment to reform. In the short term, we recommend that USAID support the efforts of qualified nongovernmental organizations to monitor government response to the OAS proposals, particularly in the sensitive areas of justice, human rights and press freedom. In certain cases, initial “good faith” actions on the part of the government may be expected as a prelude to subsequent collaboration.

In any event, efforts to promote a greater degree of institutional autonomy and integrity and to restore equilibrium of powers among branches of government will serve USAID’s interest in reducing conflict vulnerability.

3. *Encourage national dialogue and consensus* Some proposed OAS reforms require unilateral government action; others require collaboration among government leaders, Congress, elements of the political opposition, the media and civil society. USAID can advance the goal of reducing conflict vulnerability by helping to bring together these diverse actors, including representatives of the government, and promote dialogue around the proposed agenda for reform. Should opportunities arise, USAID might also encourage the generation of specific policy proposals in the above-mentioned issue areas, based on the expertise and experience of its grantees. One effort that shows promise and may benefit from donor support Transparencia’s proposal for a National Accord.
4. *Look for ways to support reform initiatives within Congress*, since the President ostensibly placed institutional reform atop his third term agenda. USAID would be well served by carrying out a formal sector assessment for legislative strengthening and complementary civil society activities, by legislative experts in and outside Peru. It is important that it look at what strategic interventions can remedy the lack of checks and balances on executive power rather than on the technocratic aspects of building the legislature. Organizations that could carry out this activity might include Transparencia and Instituto Apoyo.

While the government may have cobbled together a parliamentary majority, there is no guarantee the new “majority coalition” will prove as cohesive as the 1995-2000 congressional majority. A weaker majority (and stronger minority) may allow for a wider debate over issues of political reform, many of which are at the heart of the current discontent. For example, there may be an opportunity to review and modify the unitary district to a form of multiple districts, a reform, which, if implemented prior to the 2005 elections, would strengthen representation of areas currently vulnerable to unrest. Debate over the reform of the electoral rules should also cover the election of Mayors and Municipal councils.¹⁷

5. *Efforts to advance decentralization* in the absence of formal decentralization policies would help prepare municipal governments for governing responsibilities, thereby defusing regional antagonism toward the central government. Local and regional initiatives that contribute to

¹⁷ The present municipal electoral law gives a Mayor elected by a simple majority a minimum of 50 percent plus one of the councilpersons, even if he and his running mates receive less than half the votes cast.

greater local participation in decision-making, community development and strategic planning and technical assistance to create capacity for municipalities to generate their own resources.

6. *Continue supporting civil society organizations that promote peaceful participation in the political process*, including NGOs that succeed in channeling group grievances to effect change through peaceful means. Toward this end, USAID should continue to work with both GOP entities like the Defensoría del Pueblo, and leading rights organizations. An explicit commitment to peaceful participation within a democratic framework could be a minimum requirement for all USAID grantees. Efforts to support NGOs that deal with delinquency and violent crime probably would have the most impact in furthering USAID goals.
7. *Give priority to strengthening **political** society* (see D&G Assessment for definition). This could include prioritizing D&G partners that aggregate interests and represent them in the public sphere, influence the accountability of public institutions, and offer viable governance alternatives. This refers to actors that have a national presence, have practical knowledge of the legal and political system, undertake or make effective use of applied policy research and media for communicating messages and promoting campaigns. (See D&G Assessment for potential partners that fit this profile).
 - Promote broader debate about and concrete proposals for reform of the existing electoral rules and structures of representation which contribute to party fragmentation and weakness (e.g., the unitary district, simultaneous election of President and Congress, the number of representatives, the election of mayors and municipal councils, etc.).
 - Sponsor activities that address the problem of strengthening political society and overcoming both party and civil society fragmentation. While applied research can be useful in this effort (e.g., public opinion data, and analysis of electoral rules and trends), the team believes it is important to avoid strictly academic exercises.

Appendix A: Methodology & Future Application

This study combined qualitative and quantitative data sources, and performed separate analyses on data collected from each kind of source. Qualitative data consisted of a series of interviews with experts and focus group sessions conducted in Huancayo and Iquitos. The qualitative analysis focused on the potential for different conflict scenarios and attempted to assign probabilities to each conflict scenario proposed for this study. Probabilities were assigned ordinal values and aggregated to provide a composite, expert assessment of each scenario's likelihood.

In addition, the investigator carried out an interview of 75 student protesters from one national and one private university. The survey was carried out in the context of a peaceful demonstration in the Plaza San Martín, immediately following the runoff election on May 28, 2000.

The focus group sessions were more open-ended, allowing the interviewer to probe in more depth the nature of group grievances against the government, the willingness to engage in violence, the belief in the efficacy of peaceful protest, and the chief complaints of the participants in the sessions. Answers to the focus group questions were then summarized

Quantitative data consisted of macroeconomic, social, demographic and conflict data collected at the national level, from an array of sources including DESCO, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística Informática (INEI), Cuánto, the World Bank World Development Indicators CD-Rom (2000 Edition).

Data were also collected at the sub-national level, specifically, at the *departamento* level. Data included measures of criminal violence, terrorist attacks and victims, and a host of economic, social and demographic measures disaggregated at the departmental level. The quantitative data were subsequently compiled in two separate datasets, each with a different unit of analysis. The national level data were assembled into a dataset organized by year. The sub-national data were assembled into a dataset organized by department/year.

After the datasets were assembled, the investigator performed a variety of statistical tests on three of the dependent variables (internal war, civil unrest and anomic violence), in order to identify variables with diagnostic value in predicting the likelihood and the intensity of conflict. The likelihood of civil unrest was operationalized as a dichotomous variable, while the intensity of armed and anomic violence was operationalized using continuous variable measures. The identification of drivers of internal war and anomic violence was done using a variety of parametric tests (e.g. regression) presented in Appendix C. The identification of drivers of civil unrest, on the other hand, was done using nonlinear methods, including ordinary logit regression.

The quantitative analysis and the scenario development were separate analytic efforts, but interconnected in the final analysis. The scenario development exercise served as a “gut check” against the findings of the empirical analysis, which often yielded results that were ambiguous or questionable divorced from the context, or open to conflicting interpretation. The scenario development exercise also enabled us to probe the dynamics of the relationships uncovered in the empirical analysis and corroborate the diagnostic value of the conflict drivers and inhibitors. Conversely, the empirical analysis allowed us to test some of the theoretical propositions

advanced by the experts and non-experts in the scenario development exercise, and reject, for the time being, some of the unconfirmed hypotheses about the causes of conflict in the Peruvian case.

Future Application


The mix of qualitative (expert-driven) and quantitative (data-driven) approaches is a promising model that could be applied with appropriate modifications to other countries. As this was a pilot application of the assessment, there were a lot of lessons learned about how one goes about doing an assessment of vulnerability in a way that will be useful to the USAID mission strategy.

For example, this project benefited from a clear and well-defined understanding of the phenomena of interest – conflict. Broadly understood, “conflict” is operationally unwieldy, embracing everything from spousal abuse to bar room brawls to terrorism to interstate warfare. After much discussion, it was agreed that the best approach to doing such an assessment would be to adjust the scope of the assessment by narrowing the definition of the term “conflict” in such a way as to permit operationalizing definitions as measurable constructs. Having a more refined sense of the phenomena of interest made it possible to perform diagnostic tests on candidate variables and to test various theoretical propositions culled from the academic literature on violent conflict. It also provided more focus to the qualitative parts of the assessment.

It is recommended that future assessment teams collect relevant country data *at both the national and subnational levels* and perform empirical analyses at both tiers. The purpose is not only to corroborate findings at one tier with findings from the analysis of another. Rather, it is also to generate valid and reliable predictions about conflict vulnerability that would allow USAID to direct its resources geographically, in order safeguard its development assistance efforts and investments in different areas of the countries deemed more vulnerable to conflict.

Appendix B Conflict Trends: Internal War


Conventional measures of the intensity of armed conflict include numbers of deaths and incidents attributable to violence, and the ratio of deaths to incidents, which measures the lethality of conflict over time (i.e., a higher death-incident ration means more victims per attack and thus higher lethality, and vice versa).



The conflict led by Sendero Luminoso produced a death toll of about 25,000-28,000. Incidents rose until 1988, while lethality (deaths per incident) went in cycles. The worst periods were the horrific episode in Ayacucho (1982-84) and the years between 1988-90, when victims were more geographically dispersed. The bloodiest year on record was 1990 (3654

victims). The number of casualties halved between 1992 -93 and again in 1993-94.

Incidents rose between 1980 and 1988, when attacks reached its peak (at 2802), then declined from 1989-1992, with a precipitous drop after 1992, the year Guzmán was captured. The lethality of violence fluctuated over time. The death/incident ratio climbed to its peak in 1984, and dropped precipitously between 1985-88. The lethality curve climbed again to 1990 and tapered off, suggesting that conflict became more



violent between 1988-90, even as deaths per year were diminishing. By 1991, both the lethality and the number of deaths were moving downwards in tandem.

Internal War: Terrorist Attacks By Department, 1980-1998

DEPARTMENT	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Total
Amazonas	0	6	2	2	1	0	2	0	1	4	2	11	45	12	8	19	6	9	1	131
Ancash	10	29	38	24	15	68	53	116	96	242	183	164	187	81	31	19	16	9	4	1385
Apurimac	9	17	53	12	23	17	139	107	140	68	25	33	50	18	11	12	10	10	1	755
Arequipa	15	22	24	31	41	35	99	81	81	53	53	46	70	15	16	7	10	7	1	707
Ayacucho	48	150	323	460	655	362	354	404	390	381	312	197	273	114	31	119	69	58	25	4725
Cajamarca	5	26	33	20	15	21	24	98	67	117	53	88	42	23	16	21	32	13	7	721
Cusco	8	75	29	32	30	68	69	47	35	30	54	76	60	37	6	29	43	39	4	771
Huancavelica	0	2	39	78	183	163	111	68	111	161	125	57	48	103	57	93	81	113	7	1600
Huanuco	9	7	3	13	79	84	55	100	119	106	101	60	50	58	40	63	42	20	40	1049
Ica	0	14	19	7	23	16	14	23	64	85	47	26	24	16	11	9	11	5	1	415
Junin	31	54	42	68	84	174	169	242	326	594	374	277	225	160	144	168	90	81	16	3319
La Libertad	6	17	29	23	95	151	125	123	84	100	180	83	91	79	42	48	45	20	3	1344
Lambayeque	12	15	25	15	21	68	69	47	75	52	71	41	47	28	27	17	20	11	1	662
Lima Metrop.	38	190	178	256	292	589	834	696	513	642	826	1281	1354	902	501	279	232	161	68	9832
Loreto	3	11	3	3	1	18	0	11	3	18	12	15	13	9	5	17	7	7	1	157
Madre de Dios	1	14	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	3	1	0	4	0	1	0	31
Moquegua	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Pasco	4	16	19	42	89	131	113	132	101	140	161	42	58	16	28	35	21	10	4	1162
Piura	1	4	0	4	27	7	16	25	25	39	35	39	52	27	50	76	16	26	4	473
Puno	3	24	12	25	59	63	277	63	52	103	105	99	167	103	44	36	10	7	4	1256
San Martin	0	0	0	4	11	8	23	65	83	77	112	111	94	89	99	133	106	58	21	1094
Tacna	3	20	17	3	0	4	4	7	7	23	9	10	18	0	1	1	3	0	1	131
Tumbes	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	11	14	6	3	3	11	0	1	2	1	1	0	57
Ucayali	10	2	0	1	13	1	0	26	27	107	33	23	12	27	26	24	12	15	9	368
Total	216	715	891	1123	1760	2050	2552	2494	2415	3149	2879	2785	2995	1918	1195	1231	883	681	223	32155

Appendix C: Selected Regression Results

Y= Terrorist Attacks Lead Effects of 1-5 Years (Internal War)

Variables	Statistics	Attacks in 1 year	Attacks in 2 years	Attacks in 3 years	Attacks in 4 years
food exports % merchandise exports	Pearson Correlation	-0.35	-0.49	-0.57	-0.69
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.10	0.02	0.01	0.00
	N	23	22	21	20
foreign direct investment % GDP	Pearson Correlation	-0.39	-0.48	-0.54	-0.55
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.01
	N	23	22	21	20
inflation, prices % change	Pearson Correlation	0.43	0.45	0.25	-0.02
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.04	0.03	0.28	0.94
	N	23	22	21	20
manufacturing % GDP	Pearson Correlation	0.41	0.56	0.63	0.73
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.00
	N	23	22	21	20
Private consumption	Pearson Correlation	0.11	-0.15	-0.33	-0.51
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.62	0.50	0.14	0.02
	N	23	22	21	20
Revenue % GDP	Pearson Correlation	-0.68	-0.65	-0.52	-0.20
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.39
	N	23	22	21	20
Strikes and lockouts, #	Pearson Correlation	0.30	0.45	0.55	0.60
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.17	0.03	0.01	0.01
	N	23	22	21	20
Tax revenue % GDP	Pearson Correlation	-0.68	-0.65	-0.53	-0.22
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.35
	N	23	22	21	20
Trade % GDP	Pearson Correlation	-0.49	-0.33	-0.12	0.14
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.02	0.14	0.60	0.57
	N	23	22	21	20
Unemployment, Male % total	Pearson Correlation	-0.60	-0.68	-0.72	-0.88
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.01
	N	9	8	7	7
Urban population growth	Pearson Correlation	-0.53	-0.45	-0.35	-0.24
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.01	0.04	0.12	0.31
	N	23	22	21	22

Y=Civil Unrest within 5 Years? (0/1): Correlation Coefficients*

Variables	Y= Major civil unrest within 5 years? Correlation Coefficient	Sig. (2-tailed)
Foreign Direct Investment % GDP	.8595	.0000
Underemployment urban	.8161	.0004
Public spending on education % GNP	.6777	.0004
Unemployment, male % total	.6381	.0344
Labor force, female % total	.6274	.0010
Urban population % total	.5102	.0109
Government Social Spending % GDP	.3077	.0381
Aid as % GDP	-.3958	.0555
Manufacturing % GDP	-.4220	.0400
Exports % GDP	-.4575	.0246
State owned enterprise economic activity % GDP	-.4672	.0378
Military Spending as % of GDP	-.5286	.0095
Man hours lost to strike activity	-.5442	.0060
Strikes and lockouts, #	-.6348	.0009

* Significant at P<. 05

Y=Major Civil Unrest Occurs Within 5 Years: Logit Model of Civil Unrest

Dependent Variable.. UNREST major civil unrest within 5 years?

Variable(s)

UNEMPT_1: Unemployment Rate with linear interpolation

GNPGROW: GNP growth, annual

----- Variables in the Equation -----

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
UNEMPT_1	1.3938	.7907	3.1076	1	.0279	.2484	4.0301
GNPGROW	.1435	.4992	2.0937	1	.0479	.0723	1.1543
Constant	-10.8996	6.0903	3.2029	1	.0735		

Major civil unrest within 5 years? * Predicted Group Crosstabulation

		Predicted Group		Total
		No	Yes	
Major civil unrest within 5 years?	No Count	5	2	7
	% within Predicted Group	83	29	54
	Yes Count	1	5	6
	% within Predicted Group	17	71	46
Total	Count	6	7	13
	% within Predicted Group	100	100	100

Y= Anomic Violence (Criminal Violence Requiring Police Intervention)
Bivariate Regression Result With and Without Lead Effect of t+1 Years

Variable (X)	Pearson R Coefficient at t
Govt. consumption % GDP	-.49
Unemployment Rate with linear interpolation MTPS	+.74
Urban Population Percentage	+.67
	Pearson R Coefficient at t+1
Urban Population Percentage	+.55
Govt. consumption % GDP	-.65
Man hours lost to strike activity	-.47
Strikes and lockouts, #	-.54
Unemployment Rate with linear interpolation MTPS	.74
All Coefficients significant at $p < .01$	

Appendix D. Selected Macroeconomic Variables

Year	Agriculture (annual % growth)	Current revenue, excluding grants (% GDP)	Expenditure (% GDP)	Exports (%GDP)	Foreign direct investment (% GDP)	GDP growth (annual %)	Inflation, consumer prices (%)	State-owned enterprises, economic activity (% GDP)	Trade (%GDP)	Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)
1975	-0.5	13.4	16.1	10.9	1.9	3.4	23.6		32.8	
1976	2.1	13.0	16.7	12.0	1.1	2.0	33.5		32.3	
1977	-0.7	13.3	16.5	15.9	0.4	0.4	38.1		38.6	
1978	-0.4	13.8	18.3	20.7	0.2	0.3	57.8	5.9	40.8	
1979	4.3	15.8	16.3	27.7	0.5	5.8	66.7	6.7	46.8	
1980	-7.6	17.1	19.5	22.4	0.1	3.1	59.1	7.9	41.8	
1981	10.4	14.4	18.4	16.1	0.5	7.2	75.4	6.5	35.8	
1982	2.5	14.4	17.6	16.5	0.2	-0.4	64.4	8.2	36.1	
1983	-11.0	12.0	19.5	19.7	0.2	-12.6	111.2	10.6	39.2	
1984	12.9	13.9	18.5	19.3	-0.4	4.1	110.2	10.5	34.8	
1985	2.6	14.8	17.4	23.0	0.0	2.3	163.4	11.9	39.4	
1986	5.5	12.6	16.7	13.9	0.1	9.2	77.9	8.0	29.3	5.3
1987	4.0	9.3	15.5	11.0	0.1	8.5	85.8	5.8	23.7	4.8
1988	7.6	9.4	13.0	13.5	0.2	-8.3	667.0	3.5	29.8	
1989	-3.4	6.5	11.7	12.4	0.2	-11.7	3398.7	3.9	24.6	7.9
1990	-8.2	10.0	16.4	12.0	0.1	-5.4	7481.7	5.5	23.6	
1991	1.9	11.2	13.0	10.0	0.0	7.0	409.5	6.3	21.8	5.8
1992	-6.0	13.0	15.9	10.8	0.3	-1.8	73.5	6.1	23.8	9.4
1993	9.7	12.9	15.4	10.6	1.6	6.4	48.5	6.0	24.1	9.9
1994	15.0	14.7	16.4	11.3	6.1	13.1	23.7	5.5	25.5	8.9
1995	5.4	15.3	17.3	11.4	3.4	7.5	11.1	4.7	27.8	
1996	5.0	16.2	16.5	11.9	5.3	2.5	11.5	3.8	28.3	7.0
1997	3.7	16.0	15.7	12.8	2.8	6.8	8.6	3.1	29.5	7.7
1998	3.6	16.0	16.4	12.0	3.1	0.3	7.2		28.7	
1998	3.6	4.9	16.0	16.4	12.0	26.0	3.1	24.3	7.2	23.1

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2000

Appendix E: Chronology of Disputed 2000 Election in Peru and OAS High Level Mission Proposal¹⁸

April 9, 1995: President Fujimori is reelected to a second five-year term in office. Winning 64 percent of the valid vote, Fujimori easily defeats rival Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in the first round of the election. The pro-government ticket wins an absolute majority in the new congress.

August 23, 1996: Congress enacts Law 26657 (*Ley de la interpretación auténtica de la constitución*) framed to render the "authentic interpretation" of Article 112 of the constitution on presidential reelection. The law stipulates that the 1993 constitution cannot be imposed retroactively, discounting Fujimori's 1990-95 term in office and laying the legal foundation for a third run.

September 3, 1996: Foro Democrático (Democratic Forum), announces its decision to promote a nationwide referendum aimed at overturning Law 26657.

September 10, 1996: ONPE issues Resolution 69 instructing referendum organizers to abide by the *Ley Siura* provisions and seek legislative approval prior to ONPE's provision of petition forms. The JNE overrides ONPE's ruling, ordering ONPE to provide petition forms requested by referendum organizers.

October 11, 1996: Congress passes Law 26670 (*Ley Marcenaro*). The law seeks to rectify legal loopholes in the *Ley Siura III*. The new law reasserts that all referendum initiatives receive prior approval by Congress before a referendum can be held.

October 18, 1996: ONPE issues Resolution 111 that applies the *Ley Marcenaro* and cancels its official registration of the referendum initiative. The JNE declares the law inapplicable and nullifies ONPE Resolution 111. Foro Democrático proceeds with its campaign to force a referendum.

January 16, 1997: The Tribunal Constitucional rules on a challenge to the constitutionality of Law 26657 lodged by the Lima Bar Association. Three of seven magistrates of the TC issue a ruling declaring the law "inapplicable" to presidential reelection.

March 3, 1997: Congresswoman Martha Chávez lodges a case in Superior Court in Lima to overturn the TC's finding of the inapplicability of Law 26557. Legal scholars argue that TC ruling does not fall within the court's jurisdiction. On March 26, Lima Superior Court throws out the case.

May 5, 1997: On the basis of the commission investigation, Congresswoman Martha Hidelbrandt and three other legislators present a motion to impeach four TC magistrates with breaching the constitution. Opposition leaders view the motion as a reprisal for the finding by the three TC members that challenged Law 26657 and as a preemptive move to insure no future findings against reelection.

¹⁸ Chronology is adapted from Queens University website <http://csd.queensu.ca/peru2000/>

May 29, 1997: Congress removes three magistrates, but exempts the fourth. The TC remains operative with four magistrates, but is stripped of its power to declare laws unconstitutional. The impeachment meets with public disapproval and nationwide protests.

December 10, 1997: Congress passes Law 26898 that allows court magistrates and prosecutors holding provisional appointments to elect representatives to the JNE. The JNE governing board is composed of five representatives selected by five designated institutional groups. Subsequent sessions of the congress are suspended when opposition members refuse to remove placards that read, "*No al fraude*".

December 30, 1997: Supreme Court issues a ruling in favor of Congresswoman Martha Chávez's legal challenge to the original TC finding against reelection. The ruling shocks legal experts who maintain the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over TC rulings.

May 21, 1998: Congress modifies the voting rules of JNE. The new measure requires that legal challenges on electoral matters be upheld by four out of five voting members of the board. Opposition criticizes the measure as a maneuver to curb the JNE and shut down challenges to a Fujimori candidacy.

July 16, 1998: *Foro Democrático* presents petitions with 1, 441,535 signatures in favor of a referendum on reelection to ONPE for verification.

July 30, 1998: Former C90 congressman, Manuel La Torre Bardales, files a legal challenge to the referendum arguing that the "*Ley Marcenaro*" which required prior congressional approval of referendum initiatives must be applied to the process. The JNE had ruled in October 1996 that the law was not applicable. The process of verifying the signatures remains stalled by the legal challenge.

August 9, 1998: ONPE finds in favor of La Torre and sends congress the materials on the referendum for a vote. *Foro Democrático* appeals to JNE to overturn the ruling and halt a congressional vote. JNE reverses its previous ruling and remits the referendum initiative for a congressional vote.

August 27, 1998: As hundreds of protesters gather outside of the congress, the majority disallows the referendum by a vote of 67 to 44. The vote is met with public disapproval and nationwide protests.

September 28, 1998: Supreme Court rules in favor of a petition challenging the TC finding regarding the "inapplicability" of the *Ley de interpretación auténtica*. The ruling is similar to that issued in a previous case filed by Congresswoman Chávez which endorsed the legality of the law for reelection.

December 27, 1999: President Fujimori announces he will seek a third term.

December 31, 1999: The JNE rejects legal arguments to bar Fujimori's candidacy in 2000. Nine motions concerning violations of election law were rejected unanimously by the JNE. Because the JNE's finding cannot be appealed or overturned, the ruling ends any further legal challenges to reelection.

January-March 2000: The campaign takes place amid criticism from observers, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Carter Center-National Democratic Institute (NDI) mission, that opposition candidates were not given access to open signal television coverage for campaign spots; that the government misused public resources to gain electoral advantage; and that the ONPE had not tested its vote counting software. The Carter Center concludes “conditions do not exist for free and fair elections,” requesting the government make specific changes in advance of the elections.

April 9, 2000: Elections are held without incident, with 20,000 national observers from Transparencia, the OAS and other international monitors. Exit polls project that none of the candidates received enough of the vote to avoid a second round, with Toledo slightly ahead of Fujimori. In the Congressional vote, the government appeared to lose its majority. Transparencia projects 48.7% for Fujimori to 41% for Toldedo. Toledo urges a march on the Presidential Palace, warning of electronic fraud.

April 10, 2000: Mass demonstrations in Lima and other cities against possible fraud.

April 14, 2000: Reports by observers and media confirm irregularities in the election.

April 19, 2000: The ONPE reports that Fujimori won 49.89 percent of the valid votes; 40.15 percent of valid votes went to Alejandro Toledo. The latest figures account for 99.972 percent of all the voting tables in Peru and therefore require a runoff. ONPE dismissed charges that vote count documents had been adulterated and that its computer system had been infiltrated by hackers.

April 29, 2000: JNE sets 28 May as the date for the runoff, after the ONPE turned over the official results of 9 April. ONPE comes under heavy criticism for its slow processing of the official results.

May 22, 2000: Alejandro Toledo notifies the ONPE of his decision to withdraw from the May 28 election. Toledo reiterates that he is not withdrawing from the election altogether, but that his participation is contingent on the postponement of the election. He requests that authorities change the date of the runoff to 18 June. The OAS announces it will suspend its observation of the elections.

May 25, 2000: OAS and Carter Center-NDI missions withdraw from active observation of the runoff election. Both urged the government to postpone the runoff. The OAS said that the government had failed to address problems detected in the first round, ranging from inadequacies in the computer system and election management, to inequities in media access, and inappropriate use of public resources. The OAS concluded that the process was "far from being free and fair."

May 28, 2000: The runoff is held with only one group, the Andean Parliamentary Commission participating in the observation. There are massive peaceful mobilizations in support of Toledo or against election fraud throughout Peru's largest cities. There is a violent protest in Huancayo.

June 1, 2000: ONPE announces the official results. Fujimori wins with 51.2% of the total votes cast. Toledo took 17.68%. If only valid votes are counted, results are: Fujimori 74.3% Toledo, 25.67%

In the wake of the elections in Peru, a high level OAS mission recently proposed a set of institutional reforms that should be undertaken in Peru in the short term, involving concrete government actions as well as dialogue and collaboration with the political opposition and civil society organizations. (See below) These include reestablishing the independence of the Judiciary, strengthening the rule of law and separation of powers, ensuring adequate protection of human rights and press freedom, and reforming the electoral system itself.

Proposals Proposed by OAS Mission in June 2000

1. Reform of Judiciary, Strengthening the Rule of Law, Separation of Powers

a) Independence of the Judiciary

- Assure independence of the Judiciary.
- Dissolve the Executive Commissions created to reform the judiciary and restore the governing laws for the Judiciary and Ministerio Público.
- Resolution of the problem of temporary judges.
- Restoration of the independence of the National Council including independence in the selection of judges and public prosecutors.
- Reform the system of military justice.
- In order to assure the constitutionality of legislation, options include: - - reestablishing the Constitutional Tribunal by reinstating the three magistrates dismissed by the Congress;
- - selection of new judges for the Constitutional Tribunal through a consensus of all the parties represented in the Congress.

b) Balancing Human Rights and Security

- Establish a national independent commission to keep vigil over the protection of human rights, and which would complement the functions of the National Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo).
 - Study the possibility of returning to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Justice (la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos).
 - Invitation to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos) to pay a visit to Peru.
 - Establish a National Plan to protect human rights, assisted by the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (Instituto Interamericano de los Derechos Humanos).
- MECHANISM: by members of the Congress from both pro-government and opposition parties. Consult with the Inter-American Law Committee (Comité Jurídico Interamericano).

2. Freedom of Expression and the Press

- Solve to the satisfaction of both parties, the problems of the two television channels.
- Satisfactory solution of the Baruch Ivcher case.
- Guarantee the independence of the media, especially the electronic media, and permit unrestricted access to them.
- Guarantee access to media for all political parties.

- Legislation which permits access to information.
- The management of state publicity conforms to the Act on Contracts and Acquisitions Made by the State (Ley de Contratación y Adquisiciones del Estado).

MECHANISM: through consultations with representatives of the press.

3. Electoral Reforms

- Restructuring of the electoral system in such a way that the JNE (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones) and other electoral entities such as the ONPE (Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales – National Office of Election Processes) and the National Civil Registry (Registro Nacional de Identificación de Estado Civil) are merged into a single electoral entity.
- Assure the oversight capacity of this new electoral organ to investigate irregularities and apply sanctions.
- Decisions made by this new electoral organ must be based on a reasonable majority in order for it to decide on the denial of inscriptions, and contested and spoiled ballots.
- The members of the new electoral organ must be named through a process in which all political actors have confidence.
- Establishment of a multiple electoral district.
- Ensure that all political actors have access to mass media, especially electronic media.

MECHANISM: through agreement with the Democratization Commission (Comisión de Democratización) and the opposition, and with the participation of interested groups in civil society.

4. Oversight and Balance of Powers

- Strengthening the oversight function of the Congress of the Republic over the administrations's actions.
- Enlarge the oversight work of the Congress regarding the Treasury Department (Contraloría General de la República).
- Establish a program to fight corruption.

MECHANISM: by members of the Congress, national government and also the opposition.

5. Other Aspects Linked to the Strengthening of Democracy

- Putting the necessary (and transparent) mechanisms in place to ensure an appropriate civilian control of the activities of the Armed Forces and Intelligence Service.
- Reform of congressional regulations to allow the creation of a commission exclusively charged with the control of the Intelligence corps. The members of this commission would be subject to special rules in order to ensure the necessary secrecy.
- Modification of the law which regulates the Intelligence Service in order to end their participation in activities unrelated to national security.
- Study means of initiating a reform process in the Armed Forces, in order to ensure that promotions, retirements or cross-cutting positions obey professional, established and transparent criteria.
- Expand the participation of civilian authorities in the Council of National Defence (Consejo de Defensa Nacional).

Appendix F: Selected Regional Mobilization Chronologies: **Huancayo (Junín) and Iquitos (Loreto)**

Mobilizations in Huancayo

Source: DESCO

The summary below documents anti-government mobilizations that have occurred in Huancayo since July 1998, with particular emphasis on the violent protests that occurred in the immediate aftermath of the recent elections.

112547 07/09/1998 La República

RESISTENCIA HUANCA El 6 de setiembre, en Huancayo, estudiantes de la Universidad Nacional de Centro hicieron un llamado a la ciudadanía para unirse a la resistencia democrática contra el gobierno del presidente Alberto Fujimori y comprometieron su participación en las marchas del 11 y 23 de setiembre, convocadas por el Frente Cívico de Huancayo y las organizaciones de los jóvenes del país. A la movilización del próximo viernes se sumarán diversas organizaciones gremiales, vecinales, colegios profesionales, e instituciones de defensa de los derechos humanos que quieren expresar de esta manera su defensa por la democracia y su rechazo a la dictadura. El dirigente estudiantil, José Contreras, dijo que la masa universitaria no puede taparse los ojos ante tanto abuso y autoritarismo por parte del gobierno y por ello, añadió, sus jornadas de protesta y convocatoria a la resistencia cívica continuarán. De otro lado, el presidente del Frente Cívico de la provincia de Junín, Rogelio López, dijo que su organización esta coordinando con las diferentes organizaciones gremiales e instituciones privadas para que se sumen a esta movilización en contra de la dictadura.

DESCO 112700 12/09/1998 La República

REPUDIARON ATENTADO A REFERÉNDUM Las calles se convirtieron nuevamente en el escenario de las protestas de los peruanos en contra del atentado del gobierno contra el referéndum, ejecutado por la bancada oficialista del Congreso. Ciudadanos de Juliaca, Huancayo y Cerro de Pasco se movilizaron contra el intento del presidente Alberto Fujimori de perpetuarse en el poder y exigieron la restitución de la institucionalidad y el Estado de Derecho en el país. Asimismo, las organizaciones de base y gremios más importantes anunciaron su participación en el paro nacional convocado para el próximo 30 de setiembre. ** 112700 12/09/1998 La República

HUANCAYO Contundente fue la marcha que convocó la Coordinadora por la Resistencia Democrática de Huancayo y el Foro Democrático para rechazar la prepotencia del gobierno. En primera fila estuvieron Angel Delgado, dirigente nacional del Foro Democrático, Alberto Borea, uno de los promotores del referéndum y coordinador nacional de dicha agrupación cívica y los representantes de las organizaciones de base y gremios más importantes de la provincia. Estudiantes de la Universidad Nacional del Centro del Perú y de la Universidad Peruana Los Andes, representantes del Frente Cívico de Huancayo, Federación de Trabajadores de Junín, la CGTP, el SUTEP y trabajadores de los mercados de Huancayo, se dieron cita en la Plaza Huamanmarca, donde autoridades locales y representantes del Foro hicieron uso de la palabra. ** 112700 12/09/1998 La República

DESCO 119825 29/04/1999 El Comercio

MARCHA DE PROTESTA EN HUANCAYO FUE MULTITUDINARIA Los huancaínos no recuerdan una manifestación de tanta magnitud en los últimos 35 años. El gentío llenó por completo doce cuadras de la calle Real; sin embargo, la protesta se realizó sin incidentes. La multitud cubría el espacio comprendido entre el puente Centenario (lado norte) y la avenida Ferrocarril (al sur). La mayor parte de los estudiantes y trabajadores se retiró a sus domicilios luego de la marcha, mientras que otro grupo realizó un mitin en la plaza Huamanmarca. Los manifestantes portaban abundantes banderolas y carteles, y no fue necesaria la intervención de la policía, que se limitó a observar pues reinaba un ambiente pacífico. "Fue una marcha que superó a la que se realizó el 14 de junio de 1964 cuando el pueblo de Huancayo se levantó a protestar por la visita del general Manuel A. Odría. Ese día el dictador recibió una pedrada en la cabeza que fue lanzada de entre el público", recordó un viejo sindicalista.

DESCO 119834 29/04/1999 La República

MÁS DE 30 MIL HUANCAÍNOS DIJERON ¡BASTA! AL GOBIERNO Considerado como un hecho histórico, el cual no ocurría hace más de 20 años, la población de Huancayo acató masivamente el Paro Cívico Nacional convocado por la CGTP y los frentes amplios de todos los departamentos del país. Al promediar las 12 del día, una multitudinaria manifestación que llegaba aproximadamente a unos 35 mil pobladores copó cerca de veinte cuadras de la ciudad. La

compacta masa popular se movilizó por las principales calles de Huancayo hasta congregarse frente al Centro Cívico de esa ciudad donde realizaron un gran mitin. Desde los cuatro puntos cardinales de la ciudad, la ciudadanía llegó a converger en forma ordenada sin desatarse ningún tipo de incidente de consideración. Con pancartas y cartelones alusivos a su rechazo a la actual política económica del régimen fujimorista, los huancaínos y las decenas de agrupaciones, sindicatos y frentes de esa provincia marcharon por casi todo el centro de la ciudad, pese al intenso sol que se cernía sobre ellos. Representantes de los colegios médico, de abogados, docentes, cesantes, jubilados, estudiantes de la Universidad Nacional del Centro del Perú y de la Universidad Privada Los Andes, también se unieron a la gran manifestación. Junto a ellos marcharon además estibadores, choferes, padres de familia, enfermeros, jubilados del ministerio de Salud, minusválidos y representantes procedentes de Jauja, así como los dirigentes de las agrupaciones políticas, quienes cerraron filas en la gran manifestación.

122337 15/07/1999 Cambio

COTERRÁNEOS DE SENDERISTA CELEBRARON EN LAS CALLES Portando cartelones y pancartas con lemas alusivos a la paz, miles de arequipeños salieron a las calles para celebrar la captura del cabecilla de Sendero Rojo, Óscar Ramírez Durand, (a) "Camarada Feliciano". Desde las seis de la tarde, grupos de ciudadanos fueron concentrándose en los parques aledaños a la Plaza de Armas de esta ciudad, e improvisaron una marcha acompañados de una banda escolar de músicos, que interpretó una y otra vez la conocida marcha "Héroes del Cenepa". A esa hora, autoridades políticas y directores de las principales instituciones públicas se reunieron en la sede del gobierno regional y se plegaron a la movilización espontánea de la población, que llegó hasta la Plaza de Armas. "Se siente, se siente, la paz está presente", "la paz se consolida" y "muerte al terrorismo" fueron algunos de los lemas voceados por numerosas madres de familia, en su mayoría provenientes de los pueblos jóvenes de la Ciudad Blanca.

125522 15/10/1999 La República

EN PROVINCIAS JORNADA CÍVICA TUVO PARTICIPACIÓN MASIVA Contundente y masiva fue la jornada de protesta que se llevó a cabo en el interior del país, donde se cumplieron con éxito paros regionales en Cusco, Puno y Arequipa, se paralizaron parcialmente las actividades laborales y productivas en Junín y Madre de Dios, y se llevaron a cabo movilizaciones pacíficas en los demás departamentos. **CUSCO** En Cusco, miles de personas coparon la Plaza de Armas y protagonizaron la mayor movilización de protesta registrada en los últimos años en esa ciudad. En las provincias de Canas, Canchis, La Convención y Espinar también se acató masivamente la medida. En las primeras horas de la mañana la ciudad lució vacía. Las puertas de mercados y comercios permanecieron cerradas, no circuló vehículo público alguno y no hubo clases en los colegios y universidades. A partir de las nueve de la mañana la población y sus dirigentes se dieron cita en las plazas de San Francisco, Limacpampa Grande, San Sebastián, así como en el Ovalo de Ttio. "El paro ha sido todo un éxito. Los cusqueños se han volcado a las calles para decirle basta ya a este gobierno, que debe reflexionar sobre el descontento existente en el seno del pueblo y debe decir que no postulará en las próximas elecciones generales", dijo Washington Román, coordinador de la Asamblea Regional del Cusco.

125522 15/10/1999 La República

132227 24/03/2000 La República

MILES DE PERUANOS SALIERON A LAS CALLES CONTRA EL FRAUDE HUANCAYO Huancayo se puso de pie, y una compacta marcha protagonizada por más de 8 mil trabajadores que se movilizaron casi 30 cuadras por la vía principal de esta ciudad. La movilización agrupó a jubilados y cesantes, mineros, campesinos, trabajadores estatales, y maestros. Los manifestantes, que se preconcentraron en la cuadra 2 del jirón Antonio Lobato y en la cuadra 3 de la avenida Prolongación San Carlos, desfilaron seguidos de cerca por efectivos policiales

132813 06/04/2000 El Comercio

HUBO ENFRENTAMIENTOS Y MANIOBRAS EN CAMPAÑA Mientras en Huancayo centenares de jóvenes se enfrentaron a los simpatizantes de Perú 2000, en rechazo de la reelección del presidente Alberto Fujimori; en Piura, más de quinientas personas hicieron que el candidato oficialista desviara su ruta por donde iba a pasar. Por otro lado, en un acto que perjudica la transparencia electoral, fueron detenidos en Arequipa tres policías que iban a colocar más de 180 púas en la pista por donde iba a pasar la caravana del candidato de Perú Posible, Alejandro Toledo. No sólo eso; el vuelo donde iba a ir a la ciudad blanca el candidato a la vicepresidencia de Perú Posible, David Waisman, acompañado por el 70% de la seguridad de Toledo, así como por candidatos al Congreso y periodistas fue demorado inexplicablemente casi tres horas en el aeropuerto Jorge Chávez. Cuando ya pudieron viajar, el avión no se dirigió a Arequipa, donde se iba a realizar el cierre de campaña de ese grupo político, sino a Tacna. La explicación fue que hubo mal tiempo, situación que no fue comprobada. Este tipo de actos se produce a tres días de las elecciones y en la víspera de que terminen, por mandato de la ley, las actividades proselitistas.

133113 12/04/2000 El Comercio

CINCO MIL EN HUANCAYO Desde las seis de la tarde Huancayo vivió manifestaciones de grupos de militantes de Perú Posible que recorrieron la calle Real y luego, desde las siete de la noche, unas cinco mil personas de diferentes instituciones se congregaron en la plaza Huamanmarca, donde permanecieron protestando por el fraude electoral y luego marcharon por las calles. **SEGUNDO DÍA DE MARCHA** Desde la tarde del 11 de abril y durante gran parte de la noche más de dos mil personas, entre estudiantes de la Universidad Santiago Antúnez de Mayolo y pobladores ancashinos - paisanos del candidato Alejandro Toledo- se movilizaron contra los resultados que durante el día fue emitiendo la ONPE. Los manifestantes llegaron hasta la sede de la Oficina Descentralizada de Procesos Electorales (ODPE) local lanzando lemas de rechazo. Una vez frente al referido local, en pleno centro de la ciudad, comenzaron a apedrearlo, lo que provocó la reacción de los efectivos policiales que lo resguardaban, quienes lanzaron bombas lacrimógenas contra los manifestantes.

TOLEDO DICE QUE SI PARTICIPA EL 28 AVALARÁ UN FRAUDE Ante una enfervorizada multitud que llenó la plaza de Huamanmarca de Huancayo, un emotivo Alejandro Toledo, vestido con un traje típico huanca, le aseguró a las 30 mil personas que allá se congregaron que la campaña presidencial de Perú Posible continúa, pero insistió en que no participará si se mantiene el 28 de mayo como fecha de los comicios. Como ya lo ha hecho en los últimos dos días en diversas manifestaciones públicas, Toledo invocó a la población huancaína a que no asista a las urnas el domingo 28 y que no se preocupara por el pago de la multa.

134802 21/05/2000 La República

"LA DEFINICIÓN ES ENTRE EL CAMBIO O EL CONTINUISMO". TOLEDO RECORRE EL VALLE DEL MANTARO EXPLICANDO POSICIÓN SOBRE ELECCIONES EL 28 El candidato presidencial de Perú Posible, Alejandro Toledo, juró en Huancayo, ante una gran muchedumbre, luchar por la democracia hasta las últimas consecuencias y pidió al pueblo peruano que lo acompañe en ese decisivo combate. "La definición será definitiva entre el cambio y el continuismo, entre el desempleo y el trabajo digno, entre la dictadura y la democracia", manifestó entre el júbilo del gentío que llenó la histórica plaza de Huamanmarca. Toledo volvió a pedir a los peruanos que se abstengan de concurrir a las urnas el próximo domingo 28 en una actitud de repudio al fraude. "No se preocupen por el pago de la multa. Nosotros vamos a ser gobierno y nos les vamos a cobrar", dijo.

135204 29/05/2000 Gestión

MARCHAS Y ENFRENTAMIENTOS CON LA POLICÍA A NIVEL NACIONAL DURANTE Y DESPUÉS DE COMICIOS Diversos locales públicos, de las oficinas descentralizadas de la ONPE (ODPE) y de los Jurados Electorales Especiales (JEE) fueron atacados por los manifestantes en el interior del país. En varias ciudades se produjeron enfrentamientos con la Policía Nacional. Al término de la jornada de protesta cientos de personas fueron detenidas y varias decenas resultaron heridas. Varios locales públicos y privados fueron atacados por los manifestantes en la ciudad de Huancayo. Se intentó incendiar el local de la ODPE que tuvo que ser cercado por cientos de miembros de la Policía. También el local de la Sunat sufrió los ataques. El local principal de Telefónica del Perú, de esta ciudad, fue saqueado por una turba de 200 personas que posteriormente se dirigió hasta el local de Perú 2000 y el JEE ubicado en la avenida Constitución. Durante los enfrentamientos con la Policía se lanzaron bombas lacrimógenas, disparos al aire y los manifestantes quemaron un vehículo particular.

135205 29/05/2000 El Comercio

EN EL INTERIOR DEL PAÍS TAMBIÉN HUBO PROTESTAS En el interior del país fueron primero los miembros de mesa los que con su retardo o ausencia dieron el primer campanazo de que las cosas no marchaban bien y que la fiesta democrática hacía agua. El paso del tiempo confirmaría la tendencia. Luego, con el correr de las horas, la ausencia estuvo presente y las ánforas quedaron sedientas de votos pues muchos optaron por no ir a ejercer un derecho. Otro grupo grande fue pero para cumplir con la obligación y no pagar la multa. Por ello a la hora del conteo de votos se encontró un gran número de votos en blanco y viciados. Los pequeños brotes de violencia que comenzaron a diferentes horas en el país se convirtieron en grandes manifestaciones que coparon las plazas y calles de las diversas ciudades, obligando a los efectivos del orden a usar la fuerza, lo cual dejó un número indeterminado de heridos. Huancayo, Arequipa, Iquitos, Cusco, Chiclayo y Chimbote fueron las localidades en donde los manifestantes actuaron con violencia, causando daños a algunas propiedades. También hubo enfrentamientos con la policía.

135210 29/05/2000 La República

EN HUANCAYO MARCHARON 30 MIL PERSONAS Cerca de 30 mil personas se reunieron en Huancayo para protestar contra el fraudulento proceso electoral y unos tres mil de ellos, tomaron por asalto, durante casi dos horas, el centro de la ciudad de Huancayo, atacando los locales de Telefónica, Sunat, Consejo Transitorio de Administración Regional, el local de Perú 2000 y el hostal "Tíboli", ocasionando cuantiosos daños materiales. En la protesta huancaína fallecieron dos personas, heridas unas 15 y detenidas unas 100 personas, según información extraoficial. Un comunicado del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, sin embargo, desmintió que personal del Ejército o la Policía haya abaleado a manifestantes y dijo que sólo un vigilante particular al que identificó como Edwin Cándor Arteaga, hizo disparos al aire desde los techos de la Sunat, sin causar daños. Los manifestantes, que a las 4:30 eran en su mayoría estudiantes universitarios se agruparon inicialmente en la plaza Huamanmarca y desde allí paseaban un ataúd forrado de negro representando la "muerte de la democracia". Conforme transcurrieron las horas esta inicial movilización de 500 jóvenes, se comenzó a plegar la población hasta convertirse en una multitudinaria marcha que en la noche recorrió el centro de esta ciudad. Los marchantes se dirigieron hasta el local de la Telefónica, ubicada en la calle Real, y después de reducir a sus vigilantes arrancaron unas 30 cabinas telefónicas, las que quemaron en plena calle. La misma suerte corrieron numerosas computadoras de esta empresa, instaladas en la primera planta. No hubo ningún robo. Todo el material sacado de las oficinas atacadas fue quemado por la turba. La situación era inmanejable por las fuerzas de seguridad. Los manifestantes atacaron entonces el local del Banco de Crédito, donde rompieron lunas de las ventanas. Lo mismo sucedió con el local del Ctar-Junín, ubicado en la esquina de las calles Loreto y Real. Allí rompieron las lunas de las ventanas, igual que a los locales aledaños como ópticas y tiendas comerciales. ** 135210 29/05/2000 La República **Luego se dirigieron al local de la Sunat donde ocasionaron cuantiosos daños.

UN FUERTE CONTINGENTE MILITAR RESGUARDA ODPE DE HUANCAYO Tras los sucesos violentos ocurridos en Huancayo el domingo y lunes, en que fueron atacados varios locales públicos por manifestantes que rechazan la reelección del presidente Fujimori, la ciudad parece sitiada. Se siente un estado de tensión por doquier. El local de la Oficina Descentralizada de Procesos Electorales (ODPE) amaneció con inusual resguardo de miembros del Ejército que se instalaron en las bocacalles cuatro cuadras a la redonda. Asimismo permanecieron con fuerte custodia policial los locales del Consejo Transitorio de Administración Regional (CTAR), la Sunat, Telefónica y Banco de Crédito, que fueron atacados el domingo. En la plaza Huamanmarca, así como en el parque Constitución, policías de las fuerzas especiales vigilaban ante cualquier eventualidad. Miembros del Servicio de Inteligencia dieron a conocer que los revoltosos empiezan a agruparse a las 7 de la noche, para marchar por las calles y atentar contra la propiedad pública y privada. 135906 12/06/2000 La República

AMENAZAN CON PROCESAR A ESTUDIANTES HUANCAS POR HABER ABUCHEADO A FUJIMORI. FRENTE JUVENIL DE HUANCAYO DENUNCIA Y LANZA LLAMADO DE ALERTA El Frente Juvenil en Contra de la Dictadura en Huancayo denunció a autoridades del gobierno y miembros del Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) por hostigamiento y acoso en los últimos meses, debido a su activa participación en las manifestaciones de protesta con motivo de la ilegítima elección de Alberto Fujimori. Los jóvenes miembros del referido frente solicitaron garantías personales y familiares a la Defensoría del Pueblo, la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), Transparencia y el Congreso de la República, y responsabilizaron al gobierno, al SIN y a los miembros de Perú 2000 por lo que pueda acontecerles.

Mobilizations in Iquitos

Source: DESCO

The summary below documents anti-government mobilizations that have occurred in Iquitos since May 1998. The 1998 protests were in response to the peace accord with Ecuador, and were organized to a large extent by the Frente Patriótico de Loreto. The 2000 mobilizations were in response to controversy surrounding the elections, along with issue related to sovereignty, the peace accord with Ecuador and general protest against the government.

108563 15/05/1998 El Comercio, La República

El 14 de mayo, en Iquitos, se realizó una paralización provincial, convocada por la Asociación de Municipalidades de Loreto y el Frente Patriótico, fue acatada en esta ciudad por un 90 por ciento de la población, según se pudo comprobar en las diferentes arterias. En un comunicado conjunto, los organizadores del paro exigieron la restitución del canon petrolero, mayor transparencia en las conversaciones con el Ecuador, una efectiva descentralización y la paralización al proceso de privatización de empresas estratégicas en Loreto. No hubo incidentes en el transcurso del día. Durante la madrugada, la policía detuvo a 67 personas, pertenecientes al Frente Patriótico, al SUTEP y a la comuna local, que

fueron sorprendidos quemando llantas y arrojando botellas rotas a las pistas. Dichas personas fueron liberadas en horas de la tarde. A las 10 de la mañana, una multitud calculada en unas dos mil personas, recorrió las principales calles de la ciudad con pancartas y banderas peruanas, dando vivas al paro provincial y protestando contra el régimen del presidente Fujimori. La movilización concluyó al mediodía, sin incidentes. Las demandas que realiza la población loretoana se centran en cuatro puntos: Exigir al gobierno la defensa de la soberanía territorial de nuestro país. La transferencia del íntegro del Canon Petrolero a la región y aumente su asignación en 20 por ciento. Efectiva descentralización política y económica en el país y que desistuya de los intentos de privatizar empresas estratégicas asentadas en la región, especialmente el puerto de Iquitos. Días antes, el comandante general de la V Región Militar, Alfredo Rodríguez, manifestó que quienes participaran en la marcha serían acusados de terrorismo.

DESCO 114337 29/10/1998 Caretas (Nº 1540, 29.10.98) ** Así, los garantes reconocen oficialmente, por primera vez, que fue Ecuador quien les entregó a ellos Tiwinza en 1995. Queda así demostrado, sin lugar a ninguna duda, que el presidente Alberto Fujimori le mintió al Perú cuando el 13 de febrero de 1995 sostuvo que se había recuperado 'un símbolo de la soberanía patria, Tihuinsa'. Al día siguiente la prensa lo celebró. 'Tihuinsa Liberada', tituló su primera plana Expreso. 'Tiwinza es nuestra', La República. 'Fuerzas de infantería recuperan la llamada base de Tiwinza. Cayó Tiwinza', El Comercio. Todo era falso y Fujimori lo sabía. También lo sabían, por supuesto, los ecuatorianos. Y los garantes. ¿A quién pretendía embaucar? Solamente a los ciudadanos peruanos, por razones político electorales. No había ningún motivo militar ni estratégico que justificara el engaño, únicamente la manipulación de la opinión pública peruana. (Caretas, Nº 1540, 29.10.98).

DESCO 114248 30/10/1998 Expreso

DOCUMENTOS HISTORICOS DE IQUITOS SE PERDIERON EN INCENDIO Toda la historia de 150 años de Loreto se redujo a cenizas, a consecuencia de los sucesos del último fin de semana. Documentos, mapas, archivos, libros, tratados y otros, que desde hace diez años permanecían en los ambientes de la Dirección de Pesquería se perdieron definitivamente, ya que el edificio en donde funcionaba esa dependencia fue saqueado y posteriormente incendiado. Desde hace diez años un grupo de antropólogos, abogados, arqueólogos e historiadores, especialistas en historia regional, se dedicaron a viajar por las diferentes provincias de Loreto, recopilando documentación de validez histórica, para armar la verdadera historia de Loreto. Uno de los gestores del acopio de aquellos miles de documentos fue el historiador José Barletti Pascuale, quien no pudo ocultar su profundo pesar por la pérdida, ya que empleó muchos años de su vida, junto a otros expertos, en enriquecer uno de los mayores tesoros con que contaba esta parte de la selva. "Allí había testimonios de fuentes escritas y orales, así como documentos oficiales de alcaldías y subprefecturas, tenencias de gobernación, iglesias y parroquias. No sólo recurrimos a fuentes orales mestizas, sino que también se consultó con organizaciones y grupos indígenas pertenecientes a diferentes etnias de Loreto. Toda esa información se perdió el sábado último (24 de octubre)", expresó.

DESCO 114341 02/11/1998 La República

CONVOCATORIA DEL FRENTE PATRIÓTICO RECIBE APOYO POPULAR Las organizaciones sindicales, colegios profesionales, municipalidades y estudiantes universitarios de Iquitos se plegaron a la convocatoria del Frente Patriótico de Loreto para la realización de un paro regional de 48 horas los días 26 y 27 de noviembre, así como movilizaciones de protesta por el Acuerdo Global y Definitivo entre el Perú y Ecuador. Dirigentes gremiales señalaron que esta paralización constituirá sólo una medida de protesta del conjunto de acciones que las fuerzas vivas de Loreto han planteado realizar para rechazar, entre otros aspectos, la entrega de Tiwinza y de la zona donde se ubica el puesto de vigilancia Teniente Ortiz a Ecuador, así como la concesión de asentamientos y la libre navegabilidad de embarcaciones de ese país por el río Amazonas. A esta nueva jornada, convocada por el FPL que ha asegurado será totalmente pacífica, se han plegado la Federación de Organizaciones Populares, la Cámara de Comercio, las universidades Nacional de la Amazonía y Particular Iquitos, los colegios profesionales de Periodistas, Ingenieros y Abogados, el SUTEP, los movimientos políticos independientes, la Sociedad de Armadores de Loreto, la Asociación de Municipalidades de la Región Loreto y las organizaciones de base de los diferentes distritos y provincias del departamento. De otro lado, se supo que el director del Programa Especial de Comunidades de la Defensoría del Pueblo, Carlos Yáñez Boluarte, quien llegó a Iquitos, se ocupará principalmente de atender los casos de las 15 personas detenidas durante los disturbios en esta ciudad, quienes fueron trasladadas al penal San Jacinto, donde esperarán su proceso judicial. Después de los sucesos de protesta y violencia por los desacuerdos políticos, la ciudadanía está tranquila, pero a la expectativa de las acciones del gobierno, manteniendo mayoritariamente su rechazo a la firma del Acuerdo Global y Definitivo con el Ecuador.

DESCO 115031 23/11/1998 La República

PARA EVITAR QUE INFILTRADOS LA DESVIRTÚEN INVITAN A DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO COMO VEEDORA DEL PARO REGIONAL DE LORETO Ante la cercanía del paro regional de 48 horas del próximo 25 y 26 de noviembre, el Frente Patriótico de Loreto invitó a la Defensoría del Pueblo a actuar como veedora en dicha jornada, con el fin de evitar que infiltrados tergiversen la naturaleza pacífica de la jornada, como ocurrió el pasado 24 de octubre en Iquitos. "Los desmanes y actos vandálicos fueron ocasionados en dicha fecha por elementos infiltrados. El Frente a lo largo de todo el año ha convocado a numerosas movilizaciones que siempre se han caracterizado por ser pacíficas. Por ello deseamos contar en esta ocasión con personas que observen el desarrollo de nuestra jornada de protesta", dijo Efrosina Gonzales, secretaria del Frente Patriótico de Loreto. Para ello, además de coordinar con el doctor Gino Costa, quien encabezó la delegación de la Defensoría que visitó recientemente la ciudad de Iquitos, también cursarán invitaciones a los congresistas de oposición para que se hagan presentes ambos días. Dijo que, además, se han conformado grupos de pobladores que estarán encargados de supervisar la normalidad de la jornada y alertar sobre cualquier intento de parte de agentes infiltrados para alterar el orden.

DESCO 115056 24/11/1998 La República

LA CGTP SE MOVILIZA EN LIMA EN APOYO A LA AMAZONÍA En apoyo al paro de 48 horas que efectuarán los loretanos, la Confederación General del Perú, el Sutep y los estudiantes realizarán mañana miércoles una movilización por el centro de Lima para expresar además su rechazo al acuerdo limítrofe firmado con Ecuador. Los maestros y los estudiantes se concentrarán en la Plaza Francia a las tres de la tarde y se espera que a esa misma hora puedan confluír con la delegación de la CGTP que el 23 de noviembre debía reunirse para definir su punto de concentración. El desplazamiento de los manifestantes será por la avenida Garcilaso de la Vega, el jirón Bolivia, Paseo de la República, Lampa y la Plaza de Armas, donde se efectuará un pequeño mitin. Juan José Gorriti, secretario general de la CGTP, indicó que el objetivo de la marcha es demostrar que no sólo los loretanos están en contra de los acuerdos firmados con Ecuador. "Queremos que Loreto no se aísle en su protesta, en otros lugares también hay organizaciones que no aprueban los tratados porque son lesivos para el país", manifestó. Indicó que para el 25, día en que empieza el paro de los loretanos, se estudia la posibilidad de enviar una delegación a esa ciudad y además se coordinan con gremios como construcción civil y jubilados la realización de acciones de apoyo a la protesta.

DESCO 116711 16/01/1999 La mayoría de los diarios

MOVILIZACION EN TARAPOTO CONTRA LEY DE AMAZONIA TARAPOTO El 15 de enero, unas siete mil personas realizaron una marcha de protesta en Tarapoto para pedir al gobierno central que reduzca también en el departamento de San Martín los precios de los combustibles, tal como en los departamentos de Loreto, Ucayali y Madre de Dios, que han resultado, según los manifestantes, los más beneficiados con la ley de Promoción de la Inversión en la Amazonía. Encabezó la movilización la alcaldesa provincial, Marina Aguilar, quien junto a millares de simpatizantes recorrió, bajo una intensa lluvia, las principales calles de la localidad en forma pacífica, pero calificando a la mencionada ley como discriminatoria, debido a que -dijo- favorece casi en nada a San Martín. Durante la marcha, los manifestantes se detuvieron en la oficina zonal de la SUNAT, en donde solicitaron a su responsable, Patricia Rivera Kanaquiri, que los acompañe en la protesta, a lo que la funcionaria aceptó, pero al parecer más por miedo a la multitud que por propia convicción. Se sabe que dirigentes del departamento, conjuntamente con otros de Loreto y Amazonas, preparan para el próximo 29 de enero un paro regional, en demanda de una solución a sus reclamos. La movilización se inició a las nueve de la mañana y culminó a la una de la tarde con un mitin en la Plaza de Armas. Durante la marcha la mayoría de entidades públicas y privadas prefirieron atender en forma restringida al público en previsión de algún acto de violencia.

DESCO 117105 30/01/1999 La República

DECENAS DE MILES SE VUELCAN A LAS CALLES EN LA AMAZONIA El 29 de enero, bajo las consignas de paz sin entreguismo, descentralización y desarrollo -y con la compañía del abrasador sol o de la lluvia- decenas de miles de pobladores se volcaron a las calles de la Amazonía peruana, protagonizando la primera movilización de la selva peruana luego de la suscripción de los acuerdos con Ecuador, y a pocas semanas de la aprobación de la Ley de la Amazonía, cuyos alcances masivamente cuestionan. Aproximadamente diez mil personas recorrieron las principales calles de la ciudad de Iquitos, mientras piquetes del Ejército y un helicóptero de la Policía Nacional vigilaban el desplazamiento de los manifestantes. Entre los dirigentes del Frente figuraron su presidente, Antonio D'Onadío Lagrotte, el vicepresidente Eloy Pizango Paima, y la secretaria general Efrosina Gonzales. A la gran movilización loreтана también acudieron delegados de otros departamentos amazónicos, como el presidente del Comité Cívico de San Martín, Ramón Amaringo, cuyo vibrante discurso en la Plaza 28 de Julio despertó el patriotismo de los manifestantes. "Loreto, Ucayali y San Martín, unidos hasta el fin" era el representativo lema que entonaba ante la multitud, como prueba de la unión amazónica frente a la postergación y centralismo del gobierno.

DESCO 117106 30/01/1999 La República

D'ONADIO: "NO ACEPTAMOS CENTROS DE NAVEGACION" El presidente del Frente Patriótico de Loreto (FPL), Antonio D'Onadío Lagrotte, manifestó que la lucha del pueblo loreto es para defender la integridad territorial y rechazar "la cabecera de puente" que representan los dos establecimientos comerciales concedidos al Ecuador. "Somos patriotas y que nadie lo dude. No somos ignorantes ni cuatro gatos, tal como se atrevió a decir el actual mandatario cuando salimos a las calles para protestar", sostuvo.

DESCO 117107 30/01/1999 La República

FRENTE PATRIOTICO DE LORETO INAUGURA CONGRESO El 29 de enero, se inauguró el Primer Congreso del Frente Patriótico de Loreto (FPL) para evaluar la labor cumplida en los dos últimos años y elaborar nuevas estrategias para defender el territorio nacional. Luego de la exitosa marcha pacífica por la ciudad de Iquitos, los delegados del FPL se reunieron en el local ubicado en la cuarta cuadra de García Sáenz para participar en el Primer Congreso que será clausurado el domingo 31. Dentro de la agenda de debate, se evaluará las medidas de rechazo a la comisión encargada de ubicar los centros de comercio y navegación para el Ecuador y la elección de un gobierno regional autónomo elegido por la población. Asimismo, abordarán los eventuales alcances de una verdadera ley de desarrollo integral de los pueblos amazónicos, la defensa de la Seguridad Social, el respeto a los jubilados y pensionistas, y el rechazo a la instalación de bases militares norteamericanas en Loreto.

DESCO 117109 30/01/1999 La República

Y OTROS 12 MIL SE MOVILIZAN EN PUCALLPA El 29 de enero, más de diez mil pobladores provenientes de diversas provincias y distritos de la región Ucayali se volcaron a las calles de Pucallpa para demandar a las autoridades del gobierno central una serie de medidas y beneficios destinadas al desarrollo de sus pueblos. Con pancartas alusivas al derecho de los pueblos amazónicos y en contra de la ley de la Amazonía y, acompañados de gritos de "queremos desarrollo", "descentralización" y "no al Estado de Emergencia", bases sindicales, transportistas, dirigentes vecinales, estudiantes y pobladores en general marcharon por las principales calles de Pucallpa.

DESCO 117105 30/01/1999 La República

DECENAS DE MILES SE VUELCAN A LAS CALLES EN LA AMAZONIA El 29 de enero, bajo las consignas de paz sin entreguismo, descentralización y desarrollo -y con la compañía del abrasador sol o de la lluvia- decenas de miles de pobladores se volcaron a las calles de la Amazonía peruana, protagonizando la primera movilización de la selva peruana luego de la suscripción de los acuerdos con Ecuador, y a pocas semanas de la aprobación de la Ley de la Amazonía, cuyos alcances masivamente cuestionan. Aproximadamente diez mil personas recorrieron las principales calles de la ciudad de Iquitos, mientras piquetes del Ejército y un helicóptero de la Policía Nacional vigilaban el desplazamiento de los manifestantes. Entre los dirigentes del Frente figuraron su presidente, Antonio D'Onadío Lagrotte, el vicepresidente Eloy Pizango Paima, y la secretaria general Efrocina Gonzales. A la gran movilización loreto también acudieron delegados de otros departamentos amazónicos, como el presidente del Comité Cívico de San Martín, Ramón Amaringo, cuyo vibrante discurso en la Plaza 28 de Julio despertó el patriotismo de los manifestantes. "Loreto, Ucayali y San Martín, unidos hasta el fin" era el representativo lema que entonaba ante la multitud, como prueba de la unión amazónica frente a la postergación y centralismo del gobierno.

DESCO 117138 31/01/1999 La República

GENERAL SINESIO JARAMA: "RESPETEN A LORETO, AUNQUE SU RECLAMO NO TIENE SENTIDO" El presidente de la Sociedad de Industrias de la Amazonía, general EP (r) Sinesio Jarama, pidió al gobierno y a todos los sectores del país que respeten la protesta de los loreto en contra del Tratado de Comercio y navegación "porque es la manifestación del sentimiento de un pueblo". Sin embargo, sostuvo que ese reclamo que está fuera de lugar porque los hechos son irreversibles. Sobre la actual coyuntura política, afirmó que el presidente Alberto Fujimori está impedido constitucionalmente de postular a la reelección en el 2000 pero manifestó que es difícil que surja un candidato de consenso de la oposición. Jarama dijo que "No pertenezco al Frente patriótico, tampoco he participado en las distintas manifestaciones que ha venido haciendo. Pero, querrámoslo o no, los acuerdos fueron aprobados por el Congreso y ratificados por el presidente, sólo falta el intercambio de los instrumentos. Además, los acuerdos están en proceso de implementación. Cualquier protesta o manifestación en contra obviamente está fuera de lugar".

DESCO 117137 31/01/1999 La República

DONAYRE DENUNCIA INFLITRACION DEL SIN EN FRENTE PATRIOTICO DE LORETO El congresista Jorge Donayre (I) advirtió que el Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) efectúa un proceso de infiltración en el Frente Patriótico de Loreto (FPL) para neutralizar su lucha por la defensa de la integridad territorial y la autonomía de la región.

Según explicó, el objetivo del SIN es crear divisionismo al interior del Frente durante su Primer Congreso que hoy se clausura en la ciudad de Iquitos. "Hay gente especializada en esta clase de trabajos, tal como sucedió con la Asociación de Municipalidades del Perú (AMPE)", sostuvo. Para el parlamentario, la mayor preocupación es la actitud del actual alcalde provincial de Maynas, Iván Vásquez Valera, quien demuestra en las últimas semanas indicios de un posible acercamiento con el gobierno central. Indicó que esta situación configura un serio peligro para el FPL porque es la organización civil de mayor representatividad en la región amazónica, además de ser la primera fuerza democrática que surgió en el país para defender los intereses de la selva peruana.

DESCO 117138 31/01/1999 La República

GENERAL SINESIO JARAMA: "RESPETEN A LORETO, AUNQUE SU RECLAMO NO TIENE SENTIDO" El presidente de la Sociedad de Industrias de la Amazonía, general EP (r) Sinesio Jarama, pidió al gobierno y a todos los sectores del país que respeten la protesta de los loretanos en contra del Tratado de Comercio y navegación "porque es la manifestación del sentimiento de un pueblo". Sin embargo, sostuvo que ese reclamo que está fuera de lugar porque los hechos son irreversibles. Sobre la actual coyuntura política, afirmó que el presidente Alberto Fujimori está impedido constitucionalmente de postular a la reelección en el 2000 pero manifestó que es difícil que surja un candidato de consenso de la oposición. Jarama ijo que "No pertenezco al Frente patriótico, tampoco he participado en las distintas manifestaciones que ha venido haciendo. Pero, querrámoslo o no, los acuerdos fueron aprobados por el Congreso y ratificados por el presidente, sólo falta el intercambio de los instrumentos. Además, los acuerdos están en proceso de implementación. Cualquier protesta o manifestación en contra obviamente está fuera de lugar".

DESCO 117139 31/01/1999 La República

La República (31.1.99), en su editorial "La protesta amazónica. Fujimorismo rehúsa todo diálogo", opina: "El viernes pasado se registró un hecho inédito en la historia de los pueblos amazónicos. Por primera vez las poblaciones de tres ciudades de primera importancia: Iquitos, Tarapoto y Pucallpa se unieron en una protesta pacífica y multitudinaria contra las limitaciones de la recién promulgada Ley de la Amazonía, los alcances de los Acuerdos con Ecuador y el estado de abandono en que se encuentran por obra del desmesurado centralismo fujimorista. En Iquitos, que desde hace meses encabeza el más fundamentado cuestionamiento a las concesiones hechas a Ecuador, treinta mil personas marcharon por las calles, convocados por el Frente Patriótico de Loreto y diversos gremios como Construcción Civil, docentes de la universidad de la Amazonía Peruana, empleados del Concejo Provincial de Maynas y asociaciones de base. El núcleo de la protesta sigue siendo el mismo: su inamovible oposición a la instalación de los centros de comercio y navegación ecuatorianos dispuestos por el Acuerdo de Paz, y el plazo que está corriendo para la elección de un gobierno regional autónomo como fruto de comicios libres y supervisados por la propia población y observadores nacionales. Pese a la campaña hecha por el gobierno y sus servicios de inteligencia para desacreditar a los dirigentes del Frente Patriótico, campaña en la que intervinieron inclusive ministros enviados desde Lima cuya presencia sólo contribuyó a exacerbar los ánimos, el apoyo al Frente es mayoritario y crece cada día. ** 117139 31/01/1999 La República

DESCO 117523 17/02/1999 La República

PARO EN MOYOBAMBA CONTRA LA LEY DE LA AMAZONIA Tal como ocurrió en Iquitos, Ucayali, Tarapoto, Huánuco y Jaén, más de siete mil pobladores, dirigentes de organizaciones representativas de todos los sectores sociales y económicos y autoridades municipales de Moyobamba, San Martín, paralizaron esta ciudad y salieron por las calles para protestar contra la Ley de la Amazonía y demandar al gobierno beneficios a favor de su provincia. Encabezados por los representantes del Frente Patriótico de Moyobamba, representantes de los sectores profesionales e instituciones cívicas, así como docentes, estudiantes, transportistas, dirigentes laborales y vecinales, se hicieron presentes en la plaza de Armas de Moyobamba, a las 10 de la mañana. La movilización considerada por sus convocantes como pacífica y exitosa, fue uno de los actos centrales del paro de 24 horas, acatado por los moyobambinos. En su marcha por las céntricas calles de la ciudad, los manifestantes reiteraron en sus consignas, pancartas y banderolas, la modificatoria de la Ley de la Amazonía y el retorno de algunas sedes regionales a su jurisdicción, entre otros beneficios. Dijeron que la Ley de Promoción e Inversión en la Amazonía es discriminatoria porque sólo beneficia a una parte de la selva. El alcalde de esa provincia, Eduardo Díaz Acosta, quien fue invitado a participar a plegarse al paro y a la movilización, justificó los reclamos de su población y anunció que la municipalidad los apoyará en todas sus demandas. Sobre la cuestionada Ley de la Amazonía dijo que esta norma no puede hacer diferencias en la selva peruana. "No se puede hablar de selva alta, ni rebajar el precio de la gasolinas para algunas regiones y mantener las tarifas en otras", opinó.

DESCO 119332 13/04/1999 La República

FRENTE PATRIÓTICO DE LORETO RECHAZA ENTREGA DE ENCLAVE DE SARAMERIZA Ante las declaraciones formuladas por el mandatario Alberto Fujimori, en la localidad de Sarameriza, ubicada en el distrito de

Manseriche los loretanos rechazan cualquier entrega de territorio, afirmaron los integrantes del Frente Patriótico de Loreto (FPL). Efrolina Gonzáles señaló que la intención del gobierno es provocadora y que ésta será rechazada el 28 de abril, el día en que Loreto realice el Paro Cívico contra la entrega de estos enclaves. Eloy Pizango vicepresidente del FPL, indicó que el Frente Patriótico oportunamente hizo conocer al Perú y al mundo que el Acuerdo Global y particularmente el Tratado de Comercio y Navegación es inejecutable. Antonio D'Onadio presidente del FPL, señaló que el ambiente en el Frente Patriótico es el mismo.

DESCO 119548 20/04/1999 La República

FRENTE PATRIÓTICO DE LORETO GOBIERNO REALIZA CAMPAÑA SICOSOCIAL PARA FACILITAR CONSTRUCCIÓN DE "ENCLAVES" Líderes regionales de Loreto denunciaron la existencia de una "campaña sico-social" desarrollada por el gobierno para facilitar la construcción de los "enclaves" ecuatorianos en Pevas, Saramiriza y Borja, burlando derechos irrenunciables que tienen las comunidades nativas de esas localidades. En tanto, fuentes militares reservadas confirmaron que el pasado sábado viajó al distrito de Pevas el comandante general de la V Región Militar, general Ricardo Sotero, acompañado de otros jefes militares y personal técnico no identificado vestido de civil. Asimismo ratificaron las versiones extraoficiales que dan cuenta de la participación de personal ecuatoriano en las constantes inspecciones que se vienen realizando en Pevas. Lo mismo estaría sucediendo en Saramiriza y Borja. Miguel Vásquez Reynel, veterano líder político fundador del Frente Patriótico de Loreto, manifestó que el gobierno ha emprendido una campaña psicosocial para entregar los enclaves al Ecuador, con una extensión de 350 hectáreas.

DESCO 119548 20/04/1999 La República

****Al respecto, Luis Armando Lozano Lozano, ex alcalde provincial de Maynas, tres veces ex decano del Colegio de Abogados de Loreto y dirigente del Frente Patriótico de Loreto, que un grupo de personas ligadas al gobierno están tratando de convencer a los vecinos de Pevas de que es necesario aceptar los enclaves en esta ciudad, en Saramiriza y en Borja, en cumplimiento con el acuerdo suscrito con ese país. Agregó que los nativos son auténticos peruanos y sus derechos no pueden ser atropellados, antes se les debe consultar mediante una Asamblea Popular, si desean que se coloque en su territorio cualquier centro de comercio para Ecuador "Los Boras, Huitotos, Yaguas, Ocainas tienen que merecer respeto. La población de las 54 comunidades del distrito de Pevas llega a 14,000 habitantes y la ciudad de Pevas tiene 4,000 habitantes", señaló.** 121485 21/06/1999 La República

132234 24/03/2000 El Comercio

ENFRENTAMIENTO EN IQUITOS DEJA DOCE HERIDOS El 23 de marzo, serios disturbios hubo al término de la movilización del Frente Patriótico de Loreto, que congregó a cerca de cuatro mil personas en su recorrido por las calles de la ciudad. Al regresar a la Plaza 28 de Julio -de donde salieron a las 3 de la tarde para celebrar un mitin-, algunos manifestantes se enfrentaron con un pequeño grupo de militantes de Perú 2000, organización que tiene su sede de campaña a pocos metros del lugar de concentración. La lucha fue a pedradas y a ladrillazos de uno y otro lado. La peor parte la llevaron los oficialistas, quienes fueron protegidos por un contingente policial que ingresó por la calle San Martín. La fuerza de asalto se puso al frente con sus escudos y también fueron apedreados, mientras los simpatizantes de Perú 2000 respondían al otro bando desde las espaldas de los policías. El enfrentamiento fue intenso durante casi una hora. Personal de la Cruz Roja informó que atendieron a diez heridos, tres de los cuales debieron ser evacuados a centros de salud por diversas contusiones.

132235 24/03/2000 La República

PARO REGIONAL Y MASIVA MARCHA EN IQUITOS El Paro Regional fue acatado en un 90 por ciento pese a que las fuerzas combinadas del Ejército y la Policía Nacional crearon un estado de sitio en la ciudad, y allanaron la Casa del Maestro, sede del Frente Patriótico de Loreto, y los locales del Partido Aprista Peruano y el Movimiento Independiente Avanzada Democrática. También se supo de la detención del candidato al Congreso por el Apra, Hugo Wong Luján, cuyo paradero es desconocido. En horas de la tarde, más de 30 mil personas, entre ellos los líderes de los partidos políticos, se movilizaron por las diferentes calles de Iquitos. La marcha era pacífica hasta que en la Calle San Martín con Huallaga, cerca de donde funciona el Local de PERU-2000, el trabajador del magisterio, Américo Pérez Meléndez, encabezó un intento de boicot generando que los efectivos policiales realizarán disparos al aire. Un segundo percance se produjo en la calle Tacna con Calvo de Araujo, donde infiltrados provocaron una gresca de la que resultaron heridos 8 policías y unos 6 manifestantes, los mismos que fueron evacuados al Hospital Regional donde los atendieron de emergencia, para posteriormente ser llevados sin rumbo conocido. Infiltrados del SIN, y matones contratados para crear el caos, repartieron palos a los asistentes, generando la disolución de la movilización y la postergación del mitin programado en la plaza 28 de julio.

133165 13/04/2000 El Comercio

CIUDADANOS DE IQUITOS CELEBRAN UNA INMINENTE SEGUNDA VUELTA No les importó que sobre la ciudad cayera una constante llovizna. Apenas terminada la conferencia de prensa de José Portillo, decenas de ruidosos mototaxis, caravanas de camiones y autos, así como decenas de ciudadanos a pie salieron con la bandera nacional a recorrer las calles para celebrar lo que consideraron un triunfo de la democracia, pues las cifras oficiales de la Oficina Nacional Procesos Electorales (ONPE) determinaron que la segunda vuelta electoral es un hecho casi consumado. Por la mañana se vivió una tensa calma, al punto que -por precaución- los colegios devolvieron a los alumnos a sus casas y por la tarde no hubo clases. En la propia Dirección Departamental de Educación las puertas permanecieron cerradas. A partir de las 3 p.m. se apostaron grupos de policías de las fuerzas especiales en las esquinas de la Plaza de Armas y de la plaza 28 de Julio, así como en las cercanías del local del Frente Patriótico de Loreto, donde el día anterior se interrumpió el tránsito con la quema de llantas. El edificio de la Oficina Descentralizada de Procesos Electorales de Maynas fue la sede más resguardada, pero esta vez no fue hostigada como la noche anterior, luego de un mitin que hubo en la plaza 28 de Julio.

134119 06/05/2000 El Comercio

TOLEDO: EN IQUITOS En una multitudinaria concentración el candidato presidencial de Perú Posible, Alejandro Toledo, indicó que, en caso que no existan mejoras en las condiciones electorales, no legitimará con su presencia un proceso fraudulento. Con esta expresión insistió en la posibilidad de un retiro de su candidatura en caso de que no se produzcan rectificaciones tales como una real fiscalización del sistema de cómputo de la ONPE, un nuevo sorteo de los miembros de mesa y el acceso a los canales de señal abierta. Previamente, anunció que en breve enviará una segunda carta al candidato-presidente Alberto Fujimori para que ambos, en una reunión, dialoguen para superar el entrapamiento en las conversaciones entre Perú Posible y Perú 2000. Expresó que en un eventual gobierno suyo dictará una amnistía tributaria y que precisamente ese proyecto viene siendo trabajado por un equipo de 12 economistas. En la mañana en una reunión con la Asociación de la Prensa Extranjera en el Perú (APEP) el candidato anunció que en breve presentará a los nuevos integrantes de su equipo y a las personas que ocuparían los diferentes despachos ministeriales en caso de que llegara a ser elegido. Adelantó que el periodista de investigación Gustavo Gorriti será uno de sus asesores externos. La conferencia sirvió para que el candidato precisara que él había decidido no seguir las conversaciones con Perú 2000, pues "en sustancia, no ha habido nada".

134772 20/05/2000 La República En Iquitos la movilización en respaldo a la decisión de Toledo se inició a las 3:30 de la tarde, cuando unas 3 mil personas se concentraron en la tradicional plaza 28 de Julio en forma disciplinada, pese a la lluvia que caía sobre la ciudad. Los manifestantes, convocados por el Frente Patriótico, culminaron la manifestación con un pequeño mitin en la misma plaza, donde el presidente de dicha organización, Luis Armando Lozano, dijo que el pueblo loretano está con Alejandro Toledo porque es la nueva alternativa que el país necesita para el gran cambio. Todos los dirigentes del Frente Patriótico coincidieron en que el pueblo de Loreto no puede participar de un acto fraudulento, porque tiene dignidad, por el derecho a la verdad y la democracia, por el derecho a elecciones transparentes y justas. Ganados por la emoción y su firme convicción democrática, miles de cajamarquinos se volcaron a las calles, en una jornada nocturna pacífica, para expresar su respaldo al candidato de Perú Posible, Alejandro Toledo, y exigir que se postergue la segunda vuelta electoral.

135070 26/05/2000 El Comercio

PARO PARCIAL EN IQUITOS En la capital de Loreto funcionaron los bancos. Además, hubo normalidad en el comercio y el transporte. Sin embargo, sólo pocos centros de estudios abrieron sus puertas. A pesar de todo, en la víspera -y durante la madrugada- hubo enfrentamientos entre jóvenes y efectivos de la Policía Nacional debido a que los primeros pretendieron impedir el tránsito arrojando vidrios y tachuelas a las pistas. Uno de los manifestantes fue golpeado por un policía. El local que comparten el SUTEP y el Frente Patriótico de Loreto (FPL), en tanto, fue intervenido y fueron detenidas más de diez personas. Fueron liberadas por la mañana. Ya por la tarde, unas diez mil personas se movilizaron en protesta contra las elecciones del 28 de mayo, llamaron a la insurgencia popular, apoyaron la candidatura de Alejandro Toledo y, además, promovieron la no asistencia a las urnas para dicha fecha. El alcalde de Iquitos, Iván Vásquez Valera, en un posterior mitin, convocó a los pueblos de Ucayali, San Martín, Amazonas y Madre de Dios a retomar su lucha para convertir a Loreto en un estado federal. Por su parte, el presidente del FPL, Luis Lozano Lozano, informó que el 26 de mayo planearán el boicot de las elecciones del domingo. En Pucallpa fueron seis mil los que tomaron las calles en forma pacífica.

135213 29/05/2000 La República

30 HERIDOS, ENTRE NIÑOS Y ANCIANOS, EN VIOLENTA REPRESIÓN POLICIAL EN IQUITOS. DESDE HELICÓPTEROS LANZARON BOMBAS LACRIMÓGENAS A MANIFESTANTES El ausentismo en la urnas y escribir ¡no al fraude! en las cédulas de votación, no fue suficiente para los indignados pobladores de Loreto que en un número aproximado de quince mil se volcaron pacíficamente a las calles de esta ciudad, para decirle ¡basta ya! a este ilegal régimen cívico-militar. Sin embargo, los manifestantes fueron duramente reprimidos a varazos y con bombas lacrimógenas vomitivas por centenares de policías, dejando un saldo de más de treinta heridos, entre niños y ancianos, e igual número de detenidos. A partir de las nueve de la mañana, centenares de pobladores se preconcentraron en la Plaza 28 de Julio, escenario de múltiples manifestaciones democráticas, pese a que la policía intentó inútilmente sitiarse desde tempranas horas. Primero fueron unos mil quinientos y conforme transcurrían las horas llegaron hasta unos 15 mil y comenzó la protesta pacífica generalizada en las calles . La compacta masa de pobladores se dirigió por jirones y avenidas pasando por sedes estatales como la filial de canal 7 donde hicieron sentir su rechazo por la actitud parcializada asumida por ese medio y arrojaron a las paredes y ventanas una gran cantidad de huevos. Al paso de ¡a la dictadura dile no! ¡Fujimori escucha, el pueblo te repudia! ¡Fujimori y Montesinos, son los mismos asesinos! entre otras frases.

Appendix G: Persons Interviewed

USAID/PERU

Carrie Thompson, Chief, Office of Democratic Initiatives (ODI)
Thomas Kellermann, Tom Kellermann, Chief, Strategy Analysis and Results Team (START)
Adrian Fajardo, Senior Economist, Strategy Analysis and Results Team (START)

PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT

Executive: Rizo Patron Velarde, Cristina. Advisor to the Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros.

Congress: Carlos Torres y Torres Lara, Presidente de la Comisión de Constitución and former President of Congress; Beatriz Merino, independent Congresswomen

Jorge Santisteban, Defensor del Pueblo.

Jose Ignacio Távara, Defensor Adjunto para Servicios Públicos.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS -- LIMA

Agenda Peru: Francisco Sagasti, Director; Jorge Chavez Granadino, Investigador Asociado.

CEAS: Laura Vargas, Executive Secretary.

CEPRODEP: Isabel Coral, Director; Alfredo Valencia Pozo, Coordinador del Programa. Desarrollo Local; Yanet Palamono Madueño, Coordinadora del Programa Género y Desarrollo.

CONFIEP: Roque Benavides, Presidente.

DESCO: Carlos Reyna, Eduardo Toche, Analyst

Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos: Sofia Macher.

Federación de Comedores Populares de Lima y Callao: Relinda Sosa, Presidente.

Foro Democratico: Blanche Arévalo.

Instituto APOYO: Gabriel Ortiz de Zevallos, Executive Director.
Instituto de Defensa Legal: Ernesto de la Jara, Director.

Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL): Carlos Basombrío, Ernesto de la Jara, Director

Instituto de Estudios Peruanos: Romeo Grompone, Carlos Ivan de Gregori, Martin Tanaka, Antonio Zapata (researchers)

Instituto Prensa y Sociedad: Jorge Salazar, Director; Jose Ugaz Sanchez-Moreno.

Sociedad Nacional de Industrias: Emilio Navarro Castañeda, President of the Executive Committee; Ramon Morante Cervera, Manager of Foreign Commerce.

Transparencia: Rafael Roncagliolo, Secretario General; Miriam Palomino Pareces, Representative.

MEDIA/JOURNALISTS

de Althaus, Jaime. Journalist and talk show host, Channel N (8); Columnist for *El Comercio*.

Diario El Comercio: Alejandro Miro Quesada, Director; Eduardo Carbajal Arenas, Editor General de Informaciones.

Lauer, Mirko, independent journalist and columnist for La Republica.

TV Cultura: Luis Jochamowitz, Carlos Cárdenas Tovar.

OTHER PERUVIANS

Coello Guevara, Javier. Partido por la Democracia Social (PDS), Compromiso Perú.

Del Pino, Ponciano: Universidad San Cristóbal de Huamanga, Ayacucho.

Lynch, Nicolas: Universidad Mayor de San Marcos.

Montes, Yuri. Comité de Agrupaciones Juveniles de Lima y Callao.

Tuesta Soldevilla, Fernando. Political Science Professor, Universidad de Lima, and technical advisor to the ONPE.

Obando, Enrique. Political scientist, expert on civil-military relations.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES

Carter Center: Barry Levitt, Field Representative for 2000 elections.

National Democratic Institute: Luis Nuñez, Field Office Director.

North American Analysts

Palmer, Dr. David Scott. Professor of Political Science, Boston University

INTERVIEWS IN HUANCAYO

Coordinadora por la Resistencia Democrática de Huancayo, Anonymous Representative

Frente Cívico de Huancayo, Anonymous Representative

Frente Juvenil en Contra de la Dictadura en Huancayo, Anonymous Representative

García Mendizabal, Gonzalo, Economist, Universidad Privada Los Andes (UPLA)

Murgia Zannier, José, Mayor, Huancayo

Focus Group: 10 anonymous interviewees, all of whom are currently students at the Universidad Nacional del Centro del Perú and the Universidad Privada Los Andes (UPLA)

INTERVIEWS IN IQUITOS

Barletti, José, Profesor, Universidad Nacional de la Amazonia Peruana (UNAP)

Beuzeville, James, Journalist, Radio Arpegio de Iquitos

Celis, Raúl, Frente Patriotico de Loreto

Llerona, Lorenzo, Facultad Ciencias Administrativas Contablas Economicas y Negocios Internacionales, Universidad Nacional de la Amazonia Peruana (UNAP)

Matos, Manuel Rosa, Journalist, Radio Loreto, Independent Leftist

Rios Córdova, Julio, Journalist, Radio Loreto, Member of the Asociación Nacional de Periodistas (ANP)

Focus Group: 10 additional anonymous interviewees, all of whom are currently students at the Universidad Nacional de la Amazonia Peruana (UNAP) and Universidad Particular de Iquitos (UPI)

Bibliography

Alvarez, Elena H. "Economic Development, Restructuring and the Illicit Drug Sector in Bolivia and Peru: Current Policies," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. Vol. 37, No. 3. Fall 1995, pp. 125- 146.

Bagley, Bruce M. and William O. Walker III, eds. (1996) *Drug Trafficking in the Americas*. University of Miami: North-South Center Press.

Cameron, Maxwell A. and Philip Mauceri. *The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Society and Economy*. University Park: Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

Clawson, Patrick L. and Rensselaer W. Lee III. (1998) *The Andean Cocaine Industry*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Comisión Andina de Juristas. *Informativo Andino*. (1998) No. 134 April 17.

Crenshaw, Martha, ed. (1995) *Terrorism in Context*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.

Degregori, Carlos Iván (1990a) *Ayacucho, 1969-1979: El Surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

Degregori, Carlos Iván (1998) "Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho." In Steve J. Stern, Editor, *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995*. Durham, NC: Duke Press. pp. 128-157.

Degregori, Carlos Iván, José Coronel, Ponciano del Pino and Orin Starn, eds (1996) *Las Rondas Campesinas y la Derrota de Sendero Luminoso*. Series Estudios de la Sociedad Rural No. 15. Lima: Institute de Estudios Peruanos (IEP) Ediciones.

Del Pino, Ponciano (1994) "Nuevos Escenarios Rurales: Rondas de Autodefensa civil," *Ideele* No. 71-72 December. pp. 138-140.

Gonzales, José E. (1992) *Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley*. In David Scott Palmer *The Shining Path of Peru*. Second Edition. New York: St. Martin's Press. Pp. 105-125.

Guerra-García, Gustavo. *Reforma del Estado en el Perú; Pautas para reestructurar el Poder Ejecutivo*. Lima: Agenda Perú 1999.

Ideele (1993; 1994; 1995; 1996;1997; 1998; 1999; 2000). Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL) Lima, Peru.

Kay, Bruce H. "Fujipopulism' and the Liberal State in Peru, 1990-1995," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Volume 38, Number 4. Winter 1996-97.

Kuner, Thomas P. (1997) "Peru's War on Drugs" in *Peru: Beyond the Reforms*. Lima, Peru: Comission for the Promotion of Peru (PROMPERU).

Landau, Saul (1993) *The Guerrilla Wars of Central America: Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- Latinobarómetro (1997; 1998; 1999) Summary of Public Opinion Surveys. Santiago, Chile.
- Mauceri, Philip. *State under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.
- Midlarsky, Manus I. (1988) "Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence." *American Political Science Review* 82: 491-505.
- Morales, Edmundo (1996), "The Andean Cocaine Dilemma," in Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker III, eds. (1996) *Drug Trafficking in the Americas*. University of Miami: North-South Center Press. pp 161-178.
- Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell A. Seligson. (1987) "Inequality and Insurgency." *American Political Science Review*. 81, 2. June. pp. 425-451.
- Obando, Enrique, "*Fujimori and the Military* " in John Crabtree and Jim Thomas, *Fujimori's Peru: The Political Economy*. London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998, pp. 196-197.
- Palmer, David Scott (1995) "The Revolutionary Terrorism of Peru's Shining Path." in Crenshaw, Martha, ed. (1995) *Terrorism in Context*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Palmer, David Scott (1996) "Peru, Drugs and the Shining Path" in Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker III, eds. (1996) *Drug Trafficking in the Americas*. University of Miami: North-South Center Press. pp. 179-200.
- Palmer, David Scott, ed (1994) *The Shining Path of Peru*. Second Edition. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Perl, Rafael (1996) "U.S.-Andean Drug Policy," in Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker III, eds. (1996) *Drug Trafficking in the Americas*. University of Miami: North-South Center Press. pp. 23-42.
- Planas, Pedro. (1999) *El Fujimorato: Estudio Politico-Constitucional*. Lima: Manuel Fuentes.
- Planas, Pedro. (1998) *La descentralización en el Perú Republicano*. Lima: Municipalidad de Lima.
- Portillo, Zoraido (1995) "Alternative Development in the Apurimac River Basin." *Inter-Press Service*. December 3, 1995.
- Ryan, Jeffrey J (1994) "The Impact of Democratization on Revolutionary Movements," *Comparative Politics* . October, pp. 27-43.
- Tanaka, Martín (1999) *.Los partidos políticos en el Perú, 1992-1999: estatalidad, sobrevivencia y política mediática*, IEP, Documento de Trabajo N° 108, Lima, noviembre
- Tapia, Carlos (1995) "Balance de la Lucha Contrasubversiva Durante el Primer Gobierno de Fujimori." *Socialismo y Participación*. Vol. 70; June. Lima, Peru.

Tapia, Carlos (1997) *Las Fuerzas Armadas y Sendero Luminoso: Dos Estrategias y Un Final*. IEP, Lima. 1997.

Toche, Eduardo (1996) Regresa Sendero?" Que Hacer. July-August 1996. pp. 36-40.
Tuesta Soldevilla, Fernando, ed. *El Juego Político, Fujimori, la Oposición y las Reglas*. Lima: Fundación Fridrich Ebert Stiftung, 1999.

USAID. (1998) *Strategic Focus of the USAID/Peru Democracy Program, for the 18 Month Period Leading Up to the Year 2000 Elections*. USAID/Perú,.

USAID (1998). *The Democratic Process in Peru, 1992-1997*, Office of Democratic Initiatives, USAID/Perú,

Webb, Richard and Graciela Fernández Baca. (1999) *Perú en Números*. Lima; Cuánto.

Wickham-Crowley, Timothy (1987) "The Rise (and Sometimes Fall) of Guerrilla Movements in Latin America," *Sociological Review*. Vol. 2, pp. 473-499.

Wickham-Crowley, Timothy (1992) *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.